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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
THE MARKET VALUE IMPLICATIONS OF PENSION ASSET ALLOCATION
by
Diane Elizabeth Hendrix Turner
Florida International University, 2013
Miami, Florida
Professor Clark M. Wheatley, Major Professor
Pension funds have been part of the private sector since the 1850’s. Defined Benefit
pension plans [DB], where a company promises to make regular contributions to
investment accounts held for participating employees in order to pay a promised lifelong
annuity, are significant capital markets participants, amounting to 2.3 trillion dollars in
2010 (Federal Reserve Board, 2013). In 2006, Statement of Financial Accounting
Standards No.158 (SFAS 158), Employers’ Accounting for Defined Benefit Pension and
Other Postemployment Plans, shifted information concerning funding status and pension
asset/liability composition from disclosure in the footnotes to recognition in the financial
statements. I add to the literature by being the first to examine the effect of recent pension
reform during the financial crisis of 2008-09.
This dissertation is comprised of three related essays. In my first essay, I investigate
whether investors assign different pricing multiples to the various classes of pension
assets when valuing firms. The pricing multiples on all classes of assets are significantly
different from each other, but only investments in bonds and equities were value-relevant
during the recent financial crisis. Consistent with investors viewing pension liabilities as
liabilities of the firm, the pricing multiples on pension liabilities are significantly larger
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than those on non-pension liabilities. The only pension costs significantly associated with
firm value are actual rate of return and interest expense.
In my second essay, I investigate the role of accruals in predicting future cash flows,
extending the Barth et al. (2001a) model of the accrual process. Using market value of
equity as a proxy for cash flows, the results of this study suggest that aggregate
accounting amounts mask how the components of earnings affect investors’ ability to
predict future cash flows. Disaggregating pension earnings components and accruals
results in an increase in predictive power. During the 2008-2009 financial crisis,
however, investors placed a greater (and negative) weight on the incremental information
contained in the individual components of accruals. The inferences are robust to
alternative specifications of accruals.
Finally, in my third essay I investigate how investors view under-funded plans. On
average, investors: view deficits arising from under-funded plans as belonging to the
firm; reward firms with fully or over-funded pension plans; and encourage those funds
with unfunded pension plans to become funded. Investors also encourage conservative
pension asset allocations to mitigate firm risk, and smaller firms are perceived as being
better able to handle the risk associated with underfunded plans. During the financial
crisis of 2008-2009 underfunded status had a lower negative association with market
value.
In all three models, there are significant differences in pre- and post- SFAS 158
periods. These results are robust to various scenarios of the timing of the financial crisis
and an alternative measure of funding.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Pension funds have been part of the private sector since the 1850’s. Defined Benefit
pension plans [DB], where a company promises to make regular contributions to
investment accounts held for participating employees in order to pay a promised lifelong
annuity, are significant capital markets participants. Investments by such plans amounted,
for example, to 2.3 trillion dollars in 2010 (Federal Reserve Board, 2013). Given the
magnitude of pension assets held in reserve, it is important to understand the effect of
pension accounting standard-setting. With the recognition of actuarial gains and losses in
comprehensive income, rates of return on pension assets have an economically significant
impact on the book value of equity. 1
In 1984, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 87 (SFAS 87), Employers’
Accounting for Pensions required, among other things, that four components of pension
cost be disclosed: accrual of interest (INT) for the year on the projected pension benefit
obligation (PBO); service cost - the present value of expected future pension payments
attributed to employee services performed during the year (SVC); the actual rate of return
on plan assets including realized and unrealized gains and losses, return on assets, and
estimated return on assets including a deferred portion (RPLNA); and the net deferral and
amortization of the effects of past transactions (TAMOR). In 2003, Statement of
Financial Accounting Standards No.132R (SFAS 132R,) Employers’ Disclosures about
Pensions and Other Postretirement Plans, further enhanced pension disclosures by
requiring firms to disclose the amounts invested in 4 major categories of plan assets:
1

For an example of the magnitude of this impact, on average, amounts equal to 61% of net income for the
firms in this sample are provided by returns on pension assets.
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bonds2; equity securities; real estate; and other assets. Other assets are the amounts not
invested in equities, bonds or real estate and include hedge fund assets. In 2006,
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No.158 (SFAS 158), Employers’
Accounting for Defined Benefit Pension and Other Postemployment Plans, went one step
farther, shifting information concerning pension asset/liability composition from
disclosure in the footnotes to recognition in the financial statements.
Prior studies have also found differences in how investors view recognized as
opposed to disclosed information (see for example: Davis-Friday et al., 1999, Hirst, 2004,
and Schipper, 2007). In these studies, I look at whether recognizing pension information
(as opposed to disclosing it) altered its association with market values.3 As Schipper
(2007, p. 304) notes: “First, because recognition is subject to special criteria, and because
SFAC No. 5 states that disclosure and recognition are not substitutes, it is evident that
disclosure and recognition are not financial reporting alternatives—they are not intended
to serve the same purpose.” As previously noted, SFAS 158 requires pension information
to be recognized in the financial statements. This added volatility to the financial
statements through the inclusion of actuarial gains and losses in comprehensive income.
Speaking to the impact of SFAS 158, Skaife et al., (2007) state that “SFAS 158 will lead
to financial statements that better reflect the underlying economics of the plans…[SFAS
158] will eliminate the need to provide reconciliations in the notes to the financial
statements that many users may not see or understand” (p. 202). It appears that FASB
2

The amount invested in fixed income securities, cash and short-term securities, U.S. government and
government agency securities, corporate bonds and notes, and mortgages.
3

The passage of SFAS 87, SFAS 132R, and SFAS 158 suggests that the FASB believes disclosure, and
later recognition, adds incremental value to the financial statements.
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believes recognized information is more relevant to users of financial statements than
disclosed information. Why else would FASB have issued SFAS 158 requiring the
recognition of information disclosed under SFAS 132R? In their comment letter to the
FSAB, PricewaterhouseCoopers states. “We believe that recognizing these off-balance
sheet amounts, which collectively are estimated at billions of dollars, represents a
significant improvement in financial reporting….financial statements will be more
complete and transparent by fully recognizing these amounts rather than continuing to
relegate them to the financial statement footnotes, which can be difficult to understand.”
Many studies have verified the differences in investor responses to recognition versus
disclosure. Kimbrough (2007) studies financial statement recognition and analyst
coverage and finds them to be associated with firm value. Davis-Friday, et al., (1999), for
example, study whether financial statement data is valued differently by financial markets
if it is disclosed in the footnotes rather than recognized in the body of the financial
statements. Using several valuations tests, they find that information that is recognized
receives more weight than that which is disclosed. The format with which information is
presented also impacts the weights non-professional investors place on that information
(Maines and MacDonald, 2000). Specifically, they find that information on the volatility
of unrealized gains is only taken into consideration by non-professionals when that
information is formally presented in a statement of comprehensive income. Lehavy et al.,
(2011) analyze the complexity and readability of 10-K filings and find that “less readable
10-Ks are associated with greater dispersion, lower accuracy, and greater overall
uncertainty in analyst earnings forecasts” (p. 1087), while Hodder, et al. (2008) find that
something as simple as the structure of the indirect method of presenting operating cash
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flows can impede users’ information processing. I examine the economic effects of SFAS
158 in terms of the actions taken by firms to compensate for the effects of pension
accounting reform in terms of changes in investment percentage of the 4 classes of
pension assets and how the stock market responds to perceived changes in risk (increases
in volatility introduced by recognition). I add to the literature by examining how
accounting presentation has affected pension asset allocation, accruals and the funded
status of pension plans. There are significant differences in the pre- and post- SFAS 158
periods.
Accounting information and regulations do not, however, exist in a vacuum, and my
sample period includes a global liquidity crisis. In the first quarter of 2007, the FDIC’s
Quarterly Banking Profile reported that FDIC-insured institutions experienced the largest
year-over-year decline in quarterly earnings since the first quarter of 2001. At the same
time,

the

increase

in

loss

provisions

was

the

largest

in

five

years

(http://www2.fdic.gov/qbp/2007mar/qbp.pdf). According to the World Economic Report:
Crisis and Recovery issued in April 2009 by the International Monetary Fund
(http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/01/pdf/text.pdf),
In the year following the outbreak of the U.S. subprime crisis in August 2007, the
global economy bent but did not buckle…. The situation deteriorated rapidly after the
dramatic blowout of the financial crisis in September 2008, following the default by a
large U.S. investment bank (Lehman Brothers), the rescue of the largest U.S.
insurance company (American International Group, AIG)…. The global economy is
in a severe recession inflicted by a massive financial crisis and acute loss of
confidence.…Total expected write-downs on global exposures are estimated at about
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$4 trillion, of which two-thirds will fall on banks and the remainder on insurance
companies, pension funds, hedge funds, and other intermediaries.
According to the National Bureau of Economic Research, the recession began in
December 2007 and ended in June 2009. While the economy has not returned to prerecession levels, June of 2009 marks the beginning of an economic expansion
(http://www.nber.org/cycles/sept2010.html). I control for the financial crisis of 20082009 at both the firm and economy-wide levels and find that the financial crisis had an
impact on pension asset allocation, accruals, and the funded status of pension plans.
My doctoral dissertation consists of three essays that examine the effects of pensions
on the market value of equity. These essays examine pension reforms, controlling for the
financial crisis of 2008-09, as they examine the value markets place on pension asset
allocation, accruals and disaggregated pension earnings, and the funded status of pension
plans.
My first dissertation essay examines whether market participants assign different
pricing multiples to the various classes of assets and, if so, how this affects their use of
the components of pension costs. Toward that end, I also explore the classic accounting
question: which is more important to market participants, balance sheet information or
income statement information? I also examine the existence of synergies between them,
i.e., which is more value-relevant, information that is recognized or disclosed?
I find that the pricing multiples on the pension cost components: actual rate of return
on plan assets (RPLNA) and interest (INT) are significantly different from each other and
are the only plan costs with pricing multiples that are significantly associated with market
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values. This suggests that the other pension cost components are viewed as containing
stale information (Barth et al., 1993).
Second, I find that the pricing multiples on pension asset/cost components are
significantly different from each other. The significant differences in the pricing
multiples of pension cost components and pension asset components suggests that
investors respond to the relative riskiness of long-horizon pension assets and liabilities
(Barth et al. 1993).
Next, I find that pension liabilities have larger pricing multiples than firm liabilities.
This effect disappears, however, when pension costs and assets are disaggregated into
their components. At the same time, pension assets have significantly lower pricing
multiples than non-pension assets. The significantly larger pricing multiples on pension
liabilities suggests that investors view pension liabilities as belonging to the firm while
pension assets (with their significantly lower pricing multiples) are not viewed as
belonging to the firm. This latter finding is consistent with the constraints placed on U.S.
firms when they attempt to withdraw a pension surplus (Weidman and Weir, 2004, find a
similar result for Canadian firms).
The fact that the significantly larger pricing multiple on plan liabilities disappears
when more detail is provided regarding the composition of plan assets and costs suggests
(consistent with Barth et al., 1993) that the incremental explanatory value of pension
liabilities and costs are redundant once details on pension balance sheet variables are
included.
In my second essay, I investigate the role of accruals in predicting future cash flows,
extending the Barth et al. (2001a) model of the accrual process, in the context of pension
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accounting reform and the financial crisis of 2008-2009. I extend that research by
examining the effect of disaggregating pension information into the major components of
assets and costs. Consistent with prior literature concerning the effects of disaggregating
(Barth et al., 2001a and Nam et al., 2012), I find that not only do the major components
of accruals enhance predictive power but also that the major components of pension
assets and liabilities enhance the predictive power of future cash flows. Further, investors
attach different pricing multiples to the various components.
Barth et al., (2001a), extending the analysis of Dechow et al. (1998), was the first to
examine how the components of earnings affect the ability to predict future cash flows
(referred to below as the BCN model). They found that each accrual component
significantly enhanced the ability to predict cash flows. They reasoned that since accruals
contain information about delayed cash flows and future cash flows, the securities
markets would assign different pricing models to the individual components of accruals.
Nam et al. (2012), using a cross-sectional model, concludes that “Although the ability of
accruals to contribute to the predictions of finite measures of cash flows varies with
model specifications and levels of aggregations of the dependent variable, it is robust and
unequivocally significant when the market value of equity is predicted” (p. 172). I extend
this literature by including the effect of pension asset cost components, using both the
BCN balance sheet model and the Modified Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995). I find,
using both models, that pension assets and cost components, together with accrual
components, enhance the ability to forecast future cash flows (proxied by the future
market value of equity).
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In addition, I find evidence that managers signal discretionary information to the
markets during the financial crisis, and as a result, investors placed a greater weight on
the incremental information contained in the individual components of accruals. There is
a change in the sign and an increase in the magnitude of the effect of the accrual
components for all accrual components except depreciation/amortization. I conclude that
the reason the sign of depreciation and amortization does not change during the financial
crisis may be due the inability of managers to signal using a cost that is tied to long-term
rates of return on capital assets. I also discover a flight of capital from equities and real
estate during the financial crisis (Bernanke et al., 1996; Brunnermeier and Pedersen,
2005, 2008; Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2008 and Gelos and Wei, 2005).
In my third essay, I explore the association between the market value of equity and
pension funding status. Funding status may have a substantial economic impact on cash
flows. Under the Employee Retirement Income Security ACT (ERISA) of 1974, firms
with private employer-sponsored DB plans funded from 80 to 90 percent of pension
obligations, may have to accelerate cash contributions to the plan. Accelerated cash
contributions are unconditionally required if the funding rate is below 80 percent
(Coronado and Sharpe, 2003). The U.S. Pension Protection Act (2006) requires full
funding status within 7 years (Amir et al., 2010). Therefore, pension funding, and the
required cash to bring plans to funded status, may have a large impact on the value
shareholders place on the sponsoring firm’s equity. I find that investors reward firms that
have fully funded pension plans with higher market values as compared to firms with
underfunded plans. I also find that the capital markets perceive larger firms to have
higher levels of risk with respect to pension liabilities, i.e., underfunded pension plans are
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more negatively associated with market values for larger firms as compared to smaller
firms.
I find there are significant differences between pre- and post SFAS 158 periods. The
increased differentiation between pension asset, liabilities and earnings by investors
caused by accounting presentation means valuation errors may have decreased as
evidenced by smaller pricing multiples on pension components coupled with smaller
standard errors in the post-SFAS 158 period.
I organize the following dissertation by presenting background of pension accounting
regulations in Chapter II and each of these three essays in Chapters III, IV, and V,
respectively. I conclude with a discussion of the overall results and contributions of my
dissertation in Chapter VI.

II. BACKGROUND ON PENSIONS
While pensions have been part of the fabric of U.S. business since the 1850’s, at first,
accounting standard setters were reluctant to formalize accounting for pensions. The
reasons for this reluctance varied. One of the reasons that accrual-based pension
accounting standards were not developed was that such standards were not seen as
necessary. Rather than compensation, pensions were seen as a gratuity, a reward for loyal
service (Glaum, 2009; Napier, 2009; Klumpes, 2001). As a result, pension accounting
consisted of recognizing the cash paid in a given period. The practice of expensing
pension costs when disbursed continued into recent years in countries such as Germany,
where firms did not recognize a future liability for pension benefits (Ippolito, 1985).
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The gratuity theory came under attack in the U.S. at the beginning of the 20th century
when Henry Hatfield (1916) suggested employers should include “the amount necessary
to provide for future pensions” in operating expenses. Despite a shift in attitudes that led
to pensions being viewed as a form of deferred compensation (Ippolito, 1985),
accounting regulators felt that since the pension calculations were highly complex, and
that pension accounting should fall within the domain of actuaries (Napier 2009).
In response to wage and price controls during WWII, markets began to give credence
to the view that pensions are an element of employee compensation, i.e., that present
wages are given up in exchange for wages in retirement (pensions). As a result, in the
post WWII period, two conflicting perspectives: the finance perspective and the labor
economics perspective were developed. Both of these perspectives are based on the need
to actuarially fund past service obligations in addition to the current policy of periodic
expense measurement. They differ, however, in ownership and accounting recognition
for pension assets and liabilities. We still see evidence of the schism between these two
schools of thought and the compromises reached in current pension accounting
regulations.
The finance perspective assumes that pension surpluses/deficits belong to
shareholders while the labor economics perspective views pension surpluses/deficits as
belonging to employees (Klumpes (2001). According to the finance perspective, the
corporate financial structure of pensions is relevant in the market’s evaluation of the
sponsoring firm. The finance perspective implies that the net worth of the pension fund
(assets, current liabilities, and funded status) should be recognized on the sponsor’s
balance sheet. Actuarial gains/ losses and costs (such as service costs, interest costs, etc.)
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should likewise be reported on the income statement. The labor economics perspective
implies that the pension fund is separate from the sponsor and therefore, should not be
shown on the balance sheet except in the case of a deficit. SFAS 87, “Employers'
Accounting for Pensions” (1985), the first pension accounting regulation by the FASB,
represents a compromise between these two perspectives (Klumpes 2001).
As pensions began to be seen more as a form of deferred compensation, there was a
call for accrual based accounting for pensions (Ippolito 1985; Blake, Khorasanee,
Pickles, and Tyrall, 2008). The Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
passed in 1974 by the U.S. Congress is meant to ensure that employer-sponsored pension
plans are financially secure.

In response to ERISA, FASB issued a Discussion

Memorandum: Employer’s Accounting for Pensions and Other Postemployment Benefits,
in 1981, from which the accounting standard SFAS No. 87, Employers’ Accounting for
Pensions (FASB 1985) was born.
As I note above, SFAS No. 87 represents a compromise between the corporate
finance perspective and the labor economics perspective. It passed by the narrow margin
of 4-3 (Napier 2009), and requires both the recognition of benefits accrued as of a date
(without considering future pay increases: ABO) as well as the projected benefit
obligation [PBO] which considers future pay increases if the pension formula is based on
compensation levels. SFAS No. 87, however, clouds the value of a defined PBO by
allowing a corridor approach. Under the corridor approach, firms are allowed to delay
the recognition of gains and losses as long as they do not exceed 10% of the larger of: (a)
the defined benefit obligation (DBO); or (b) the fair value of the plan assets. Under SFAS
87, information about funded status, fair value of plan assets, expected earnings rates, and
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DBO are disclosed in the footnotes, not recognized in the body of the financial statements
(Blake et. al 2008; Glaum 2009; Napier 2009).
SFAS 132R, Employers’ Disclosures About Pensions and Other Postretirement
Benefits (FASB 2003), enhances the disclosures concerning pension plans by requiring
firms to disclose “the percentages of each major category of plan assets” without
changing recognition or measurement rules (Chuk 2011). SFAS 158, Employers’
Accounting for Defined Benefits Pension and Other Postemployment Plans (FASB 2006),
goes further than previous regulations by shifting disclosures about funded status (the
difference between PBO and the fair value of fund assets) from the footnotes to the
balance sheet while still allowing for the corridor method in the income statement.
Actuarial gains/losses are now recognized in other comprehensive income [OCI]. Thus,
current pension accounting introduces volatility to both the balance sheet and income
statement, but also provides more information about pension assets, liabilities, costs and
earnings.

III. PENSION ASSET ALLOCATION
PRIOR LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESE DEVELOPMENT
Pension funds are important to capital markets. Given the magnitude of pension
assets held in reserve, it is important to understand the effect of pension accounting
standard-setting. Prior research has found that disaggregated costs can be more
informative to investors than aggregate costs (Barth et al., 1992; Amir, 1996, Barth et al.,
2001). Prior studies have also found differences in how investors view recognized as
opposed to disclosed information (see for example: Davis-Friday et al., 1999, Hirst, 2004,
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and Schipper, 2007). In this study I look at not only the information content of
disaggregated pension assets, but also at whether recognizing pension information (as
opposed to disclosing it) altered its association with market values.
Early pension accounting research centers on the question of whether or not investors
can cope with the complexity of estimations of actuarial gains/losses over long
horizons—i.e. is pension information useful to investors? As posited by Barth, et al.,
(2001), value relevance studies, including ones concerning pension information, strive to
be informative about the effects of accounting amounts on market value, not to tell
standard-setters what standards should be. The early pension research is centered on two
approaches, a balance sheet approach and an income statement approach. It was not until
1995, when Ohlson proposed the clean surplus model in which firm value is explained as
the book value of equity and residual income that pension research took into
consideration both balance sheet and income statement measures simultaneously.
Daley (1984) uses a cross-sectional equity model based on income statement
amounts. He regresses the equity value of the firm on after-tax earnings before pension
costs and after-tax pension costs.
MVEit = α + β1 EbPCit + β2 PCit + ε

(1)

where EbPC are after-tax earnings before pension costs and PC are after-tax pension
costs. His results suggest that pension expense is the “most consistent” cost measure, and
reported period pension expense may be impounded into equity prices.
Continuing with the income approach, Barth, et al., (1992) explore the valuerelevance of the components of pension costs and pension liabilities as required by SFAS
87. They use an expanded version of equation (1) which includes pension costs
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decomposed into the various components required by SFAS 87. Their model takes the
following form:
MVE = α + β1 EbPCit + β2 INTit + β3 SVCit + β4 RPLNAit + β5 DEFRETit
+ β5 ATRANSit + ε

(2)

where INT is interest cost, SVC is service cost, RPLNA is expected return on plan assets,
DEFRET is the deferred return on plan assets, ATRANS is the amortization of the
transition asset and EbPC is defined as above. They find that investors assign different
price multiples to the pension cost components (although they find the pricing multiple
on ATRANS is not significantly different from zero). The pricing multiples on pension
income streams are generally larger than the price multiples of non-pension income
streams. They argue that this supports the idea that investors view pension income as less
risky than other income.
Landsman (1986) was the first to use the balance sheet approach in assessing the
information content of pension accounting. Based on the accounting equation that equity
is equal to assets minus liabilities, he divides the assets and liabilities into pension and
non-pension components. The basic form of his equation is:
MVE = α + β1 NPAit + β2 NPLit + β3 PLAit + β4 PLit + ε

(4)

where NPA is non-pension assets, NPL is non-pension liabilities, PLA is plan assets and
PL is plan liabilities. He finds significant pricing multiples on pension assets and
liabilities, and concludes that the securities markets value disclosed pension assets and
liabilities similarly to recognized assets and liabilities.
Based on the idea that accounting standards prevent the book value of equity from
equaling the market value of equity (non-recognition of intangible assets such as those
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which are internally-generated and the incorporation of historical values which mask
current market values), Ohlson (1995) shows that the uncaptured book value is reflected
in abnormal earnings (Glaum, 2009) and models the market value of equity with the
following:
MVE = α + β1 NPEit + β2 EbPCit + β3 PLAit + β4 PLit + β4 PCit + ε

(5)

where NPE is owner’s equity plus pension liabilities, EbPC is earnings before pension
costs, PLA is plan assets, PL is plan liabilities, and PC is pension costs. Most pension
studies, including this one, are based upon Ohlson’s model. One advantage of this model
is that we can see whether balance sheet information and income information are
applicable to pension accounting information and how they relate to each other. As
Glaum (2009) points out, the model is over specified. If, for instance, fair values are
measured with sufficient reliability, there are no intangibles attached to them, and/or
there are no synergies with other corporate assets and liabilities. With respect to
accounting standards (such as SFAS 87, SFAS 132R, and SFAS 158), researchers can,
using the Ohlson model with its combined balance sheet/income statement approach,
answer the question of whether investors place more weight on information that is
recognized as compared to information that is disclosed.
Barth et al. (1993) is the first study to employ the Ohlson model in exploring how
investors value pension information. They examine the relationship between balance
sheet and income information by decomposing the elements of pension disclosures into
their various components.
MVE = α + β1 Assetit + β2 Liabilities + β3 EbPCit + β4 PLAit + β5 PLit + β6 INTit
+ β7 SVCit + β8 RPLNAit + β9 DEFRETit + β9 ATRANSit + ε
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(6)

where Asset is the firm’s assets, liabilities is the firms’ liabilities, EbPC is net income
before pension costs, PLA is plan assets, PL is plan liabilities, INT is interest cost, SVC
is service cost, RPLNA is the actual rate of return on plan assets, DEFRET is the deferred
return on plan assets and ATRANS is the amortization of the transition asset. They find
that when pension balance sheet data is known, pension income statement data becomes
redundant, i.e., it provides no additional information.
Therefore, if pension accounting information has value relevance to investors and
investors view pension assets and liabilities as belonging to the firm, I would expect the
market to assign non-zero pricing multiples to the various pension asset and liability
components (Barth et al. 1992). My first hypothesis (in alternative form) is thus:
H1: Since the components of pension assets and liabilities represent various levels of
risk and the securities markets perceive pension assets and liabilities to be assets and
liabilities of the firm, the securities markets will assign different weights to the various
components of pension assets and liabilities.
Consistent with Wiedman and Weir (2004), I expect investors to view pension
deficits (pension liabilities and costs) as liabilities of the firm but, due to legal restrictions
limiting a firm’s ability to access pension surpluses, I expect investors to view pension
assets as not belonging to the firm. Thus my second hypothesis (in alternative form) is:
H2: Pension costs and liabilities are more strongly associated with the market value
of equity than are the assets of a pension plan.
However, consistent with Barth et al. (1993), I expect that when both balance sheet
pension accounts and pension cost components are presented simultaneously, the pricing
multiples on pension cost components (SVC, DEFRET and ATRANS) will be
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insignificant (i.e., they provide redundant information to investors). Over specification
may also lead to a decrease in value relevant information for pension liabilities. My third
and fourth hypotheses (in alternative form) are thus:
H3: Including both balance sheet information and income statement information in a
single model will cause over specification of the model: i.e. some pension cost
components (SVC, DEFRET, and ATRANS) will be redundant and thus not associated
with firm value.
H4: Including both balance sheet information and income statement information in a
single model will cause over specification of the model: i.e., pension liability information
will be somewhat redundant in explaining firm value and will decrease in explanatory
power.
Since firm value should respond to perceived levels of risk and return, investment in
real estate and other assets (which include hedge funds) will be associated with the
market value of equity at greater rates than investments in bonds and equities. My fifth
hypothesis (in alternative form) is thus:
H5: Due to higher perceived risk by investors, investment in real estate and others
assets (which include hedge funds) will have greater weights (larger pricing multiples)
than the pricing multiples on bonds and equity.
This relationship may not however, hold for all economic environments. Due to the
desire for safe harbors during times of economic downturn, it is likely investors will
reward pension funds that increase their investments in bonds and equities during
recessionary periods. My next hypothesis (in alternative form) is thus:
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H6: During the recent financial crisis, pension plan investment in bonds and equity
(representing lower risk and larger percentages of investment) will receive greater price
multiples from investors than will pension plan investments in real estate and other
assets.
Finally, I examine whether investors interpret information differently based on
presentation: recognition vs. disclosure. Adding to the extensive literature in this area, I
predict that the pricing multiples on pension assets/liabilities/costs will be statistically
different in the pre- and post-SFAS_158 periods. Pension liabilities and costs may
decrease or lose significance to investors because they are presented simultaneously with
more detailed pension asset information. Due to the volatility of the real estate market, I
expect pension real estate assets to increase in importance. Due to increased volatility
introduced into the financial statements by recognizing information in the body of the
financial statements, I expect firms to increase their investment in bonds and to decrease
their investment in equities, resulting in a concurrent change in the pricing multiples on
bonds and equities (Amir et al. 2010; Chuk, 2011). My final hypothesis (in alternative
form) is thus:
H7: Due to a change in presentation (from disclosure to recognition), the pricing
multiples on pension assets/liabilities/costs will be different in the pre- and post-SFAS
158 periods.

SAMPLE AND RESEARCH DESIGN
Financial and pension data were collected from Compustat (Fundamentals Annual
and Pension Annual) while security prices were collected from CRSP. The sample firms
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were required to be U.S. firms with defined benefit pension plans, that had total assets
greater than pension assets, and with complete financial and pension data available.
These screens resulted in 7,316 firm years for 1,188 individual firms. The data cover the
period 2003 through 2011, a period in which firms were required to either disclose or
recognize the composition of their pension assets and costs. Since I study the same crosssectional unit (in this case, firms) over time, I employ a panel data regression of the
Ohlson clean surplus model (5). According to Baltagi (1998, p.7), panel data gives “more
informative data, more variability, less collinearity among variables, more degrees of
freedom and more efficiency” while taking heterogeneity explicitly into account. Pooled
Ordinary Least Squares Regression often camouflages the heterogeneity (uniqueness)
that may exist among firms, i.e., the individuality of each firm is subsumed in the
disturbance term εt (Gujarati, 2003). I run a Hausman test and determine a fixed effects
model fits the data better than a random effects model. One of the advantages of a fixedeffects model is the ability to control for all time-invariant differences between individual
firms, so that the models cannot be biased because of omitted time-invariant
characteristics such as industry.
RESULTS
The descriptive statistics for 2003-2011 are presented in Table 1. Looking for
evidence of the timing of the Financial Crisis, we notice a decline in total assets (TA) and
pension assets (PAssets) in 2008 and 2009. There is also a decline in earnings and
earnings before pension costs (EbPC) in 2008 with an increase in both for 2009. Interest
costs (INT) and service costs are relatively stable for all years. There is, however, a
negative rate of return on pension plan assets in 2008. Despite a relatively stable
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percentage for investment in real estate, pension real estate values are higher in 2007 than
in 2008. It appears then, that the financial crisis did not take effect until 2008 and most
variables indicate the beginning of a recovery in 2009.
Looking at the percentage changes (Table 2 and Figure 1) in the classes of pension
assets, I find a decrease from 2007 to 2008 in the percentage of investments in equity
holdings and a corresponding increase in the percentage of investments in bonds. This is
consistent with managers of pension fund assets seeking a “safe harbor” in times of
economic downturn. This gives further credence to the idea that the Financial Crisis
began to be felt in 2008, not 2007.
I begin my analysis by using a simple model in which the market value of equity
at fiscal year-end is regressed on total assets, total liabilities, and earnings before
extraordinary items.

MVEit = β0 + β1 TAit + β2 TLit + β3 Earningsit + β4 AssetTurnit + β5 FinCrisisit
+β6 Fin_TAit + ε

(7)

The results of this regression are presented in Table 3. I use fiscal year end values
because they are measured on the same days as the dependent variables. As in Barth et al.
(1992), using fiscal year end values requires an implicit assumption that earnings are
reflected in the share price on that day. Other studies suggest that using this assumption
about fiscal year-end prices is reasonable (Beaver et al., 1980; Collins and Kothari,
1989). I control for the Financial Crisis at the firm level with asset turnover (AssetTurn)
since an immediate decline in sales would be the likely result of an economic downturn,
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while managers are less likely to be able to immediately adjust asset levels. I control for
the Financial Crisis on an economy-wide basis using an indicator variable, Fin_Crisis,
whose value is 1 for the years 2008 and 2009 and zero otherwise. I then interact
Fin_Crisis with TA to evaluate the effect of the Financial Crisis on TA. The pricing
multiples on TA, TL and Earnings are significant and of the expected sign. Also, as
expected, as a firm’s AssetTurn rises so does the market value of equity (MVE). The
effect of FinCrisis implies a flight of capital, behavior that is prompted by a financial
crisis (Bernanke et al., 1996; Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2005, 2008; Caballero and
Krishnamurthy, 2008 and Gelos and Wei, 2005).
Using a version of the Ohlson Clean surplus model (equation (5)), I examine the
effect of pension accounting information on MVE by separating liabilities into aggregate
totals for pension (PenAssets) and non-pension assets (AbPA, total assets before pension
assets), pension (PLiab) and non-pension liabilities (TLbPL, total liabilities before
pension liabilities), and earnings before extraordinary items and pension costs (EbPC)
and pension costs (Costs).

MVEit = β0 + β1 AbPAit + β2 TLbPLit + β3 EbPCit + β4 PenAssetsit + β5 PCostsit
+ β6 PLiabit + β7 AssetTurnit + β8 FinCrisisit + β9 Fin_AbPAit
+ β10 Fin_PenAssetsit + ε

(8)

Consistent with investors viewing pension assets, costs and liabilities as containing
value relevant information, PAssets, PCosts, and PLiab are significantly correlated with
MVE. As predicted by Wiedman and Wier (2004), pension liabilities have a greater
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effect on MVE than do total liabilities of the firm before pension liabilities. This implies
that investors view pension liabilities as belonging to the firm. On the other hand, the
pricing multiple on pension assets is smaller than the pricing multiple on total assets
before pension assets. This indicates that investors do not view pension assets as assets of
the firm. This is probably due to the legal restrictions that prevent firms accessing
pension assets for non-pension uses.
The pricing multiple on pension costs is surprisingly positive. Barth et al. (1992)
found a similar result with pension service costs and posited that this may be due to some
pension costs not being viewed by the securities markets as a measure of pension
liabilities, but instead acting as a proxy for the value created by human capital. The
Financial Crisis is significant and negatively associated MVE. Once again, the significant
negative pricing multiples on both non-pension and pension assets are indicative of a
flight of capital (Bernanke et al., 1996; Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2005, 2008;
Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2008 and Gelos and Wei, 2005).
Expanding the model in Barth et al. (1993), I examine the incremental value
relevance of the information revealed by the various components of both pension assets
and liabilities. As per Barth et al. (1992), I decompose TAMOR into two principal
components DEFRET (deferred return on plan assets) and ATRANS (the amortization of
the transition asset).4 My test equation is:
MVEit = β0 + β1 AbPAit + β2 TLbPLit + β3 EbPCi+ β4 Equityit + β5 Bondsit
+ β6 Real Estateit + β7 Other Assetsit + β8 PLiabit + β9 SVCit+ β10 INTit
4

Appendix A shows how to calculate DEFRET and ATRANS from SFAS 87 disclosures as per Barth et al.
(1992).
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+ β11 DEFRETit + β12 RPLNAit + β13 ATRANSit + β14 AssetTurnit
+ β15 FinCrisisit + β16 Fin_AbPAit + β17 Fin_Bondsit + β18 Fin_Equityit
+ β19 Fin_RealEstateit + β20 Fin_OtherAssetsit + ε

(9)

Consistent with Barth et al. (1993), I find that the explanatory value of pension cost
components is limited once pension balance sheet information (pension assets) is
included. The pricing multiple on pension liabilities, although significant and negative, is
smaller than the pricing multiple on non-pension liabilities. As expected, when the actual
return on plan assets increases, the market value of equity increases but its effect is much
lower than that of earnings before pension costs. This is consistent with investors not
considering pension surpluses to be assets of the firm. Consistent with this line of
reasoning, I find that the pricing multiples on the different classes of pension assets are
much lower than the pricing multiple on non-pension assets. While real estate assets
comprise the smallest percentage of pension assets, they have the greatest weight with
respect to the market value of equity. This indicates that investors recognize the riskiness
of this class of assets and impound that into market values. The impact of the financial
crisis is greater in this model, becoming more negatively associated with MVE. While the
pricing multiple on non-pension assets is still negatively associated with MVE (once
again implying a flight of capital), the percentages of pension assets invested in bonds
and equity are significant and positively associated with MVE. The investment in real
estate and other assets appears to contain no value relevant information for investors.
Again, this may be due to the relatively large economic impact of bonds and equities that
results from their comprising the vast majority of pension assets.
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ADDITIONAL TESTS
As I previously mentioned, the FDIC reported that the largest year-over-year decline
in quarterly earnings occurred in the first quarter of 2007 (FDIC’s Quarterly Banking
Profile). In August 2007, the U.S. subprime crisis began. Therefore, I re-run Model (9)
after redefining the period of the Financial Crisis as 2007-09 (FinCrisis2). The results of
these tests are presented in Table 4.
MVEit = β0 + β1 AbPAit + β2 TLbPLit + β3 EbPCi+ β4 Equityit + β5 Bondsit
+ β6 Real Estateit + β7 Other Assetsit + β8 SVCit+ β9 INTit + β10 DEFRETit
+ β11 RPLNAit + β12 ATRANSit + β13 PLiabit + β14 AssetTurnit + β15 FinCrisis2it
+ β16 Fin2_Equityit + β17 Fin2_Bondsit + β18 Fin2_RealEstateit
+ β19 Fin2_OtherAssetsit + β20 Fin2_AbPA + ε

(10)

The results of this regression are presented in Table 4.
While most pricing multiples are similar to those from Model (9), there are some
notable exceptions. The power of both significant interest components (INT and RPLNA)
is greater in this model, suggesting that pension costs are seen as contributing more to the
market value of the firm while non-pension assets are seen as contributing less. The most
noticeable difference between the two models is the change in sign of the coefficient on
the financial crisis variable. When FinCrisis is defined as 2007-09, I find no association
with market values. It is implausible that the financial crisis had no significant effect on
firm values given that expected write-downs on global exposures were estimated to be $4
trillion. This indicates that the financial crisis is misspecified when using the years 200709 across all classes of assets.

24

In Model (11), I specify the Financial Crisis as 2007-09 for RealEstate and 2008-09
for all other classes of assets (both pension and non-pension). Under this scenario,
investment in other assets is significant and negative, meaning MVE increases as assets
in this class are sold off. This is the only model in which the pricing multiple on other
assets is significant. The pricing multiples on INT and RPLNA and PLiab decrease,
indicating that investors are less likely to view pension liabilities and costs as belonging
to the firm. At the same time, the pricing multiples on pension assets generally decrease.
The pricing multiples increase on non-pension assets and liabilities as does the pricing
multiple on non-pension earnings. Perhaps most disturbing is that the pricing multiple on
the influence of the Financial Crisis is significant and positive. Thus these results indicate
another misspecification of the financial crisis. I conclude, based on the results of the
three different models of the financial crisis, that it is most likely the crisis occurred in
the years 2008-09 with respect to the financial variables included in these models.
I rerun the regression for model (9) using only firms with positive earnings before
extraordinary items before pension costs (positive EbPC). The results are presented in
Table 5. Wiedman and Weir (2004) find that funding status is more closely associated
with stock prices for companies with underfunded pension plans as compared to firms
with overfunded plans. Only four of the firm years in this sample are considered
underfunded using their definition (PenAssets – PLiab >0). This is a much higher
percentage of the sample than the sample of Canadian firms they employ for the years
2000 and 2001 (their percentage of funded firms is 72% an 97%, respectively). I find that
AssetTurn does not appear to provide value relevant information. The pricing multiple on
the FinCrisis is significantly larger in magnitude than the pricing multiple for the sample
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of all firms. It appears, therefore, that profitable firms were more negatively impacted
(nearly five times greater) by the Financial Crisis than a sample of both profitable and
unprofitable firms. This is consistent with profitable firms having more to lose (in terms
of market value) in a period of economic downturn. Looking at the effect on pension
costs for profitable firms, the actual return on pension assets loses its significance to
investors while SVC is significant and negative and INT becomes more significantly
negative. These results are not consistent with the findings of Barth et al. (1993) in which
SVC has a positive correlation with MVE and RPLNA has a significantly positive
correlation with MVE. This may be due, however, to positive multicollinearity between
pension cost components (Barth et al., 1992; Glaum, 2009). The effect of non-pension
equity is less, as evidenced by smaller pricing multiples on non-pension assets and
liabilities, while the effect of earnings is greater. At the same time, the pricing multiples
on pension assets are greater (with the exception of real estate assets which declines),
meaning pension assets exhibit a more positive relationship with the market value of
equity than non-pension assets. This is consistent with investors viewing pension assets
as being less risky than non-pension assets.
Next, I evaluate the effect of pension accounting reform (a change in presentation)
using
MVEit = β0 + β1 AbPAit + β2 TLbPLit + β3 EbPCi+ β4 Equityit + β5 Bondsit
+ β6 Real Estateit + β7 Other Assetsit + β8 PLiabit + β9 SVCit+ β10 INTit
+ β11 DEFRETit + β12 RPLNAit + β13 ATRANSit + β14 AssetTurnit
+ β15 FinCrisisit + β16 Fin_AbPAit + β17 Fin_Bondsit + β18 Fin_Equityit
+ β19 Fin_RealEstateit + β20 Fin_OtherAssetsit + ε
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(9)

I estimate the pricing multiples for the pre- and post SFS 158 periods with a panel
regression with fixed effects for each period, which allow separate slope pricing
multiples for each firm in each period. I test the joint null hypothesis that pricing
multiples for the pre- and post-SFAS periods are equal to one another and equal to zero. I
reject the null hypothesis (β0 = β1 = ……= β20 = 0): the market does in fact assign value to
the individual components. The results of these estimates (and the following tests) are
presented in Table 6.
Finally, I test the whether the pricing multiples from the pre-SFAS 158 period are
different from the pricing multiples from the post-SFAS 158. I reject the null hypothesis
that the pricing multiples from pre-SFA 158 period equal from the pricing multiples from
the post-SFS period (p = 0.000). This implies investors assign different market values
based on a change in presentation (in this case, going from disclosure to recognition).
I find that generally the pricing multiples on pension costs are insignificant,
consistent with Barth et al. (1993) that income statement information is often redundant
when presented simultaneously with balance sheet information. Although the pricing
multiple on pension interest costs (INT) maintains significance, its coefficient is lower
when information quality increases due to recognition. A similar effect is observed for
the pricing multiple on pension liabilities (PLiab).
The reaction to a change in presentation is, as predicted, mixed for the classes of
pension asset. Real estate investments, the most volatile class of assets due to the
subprime mortgage bubble in late 2006, has the largest increase in value assigned by the
market, nearly twice the magnitude of change for bonds and equity. Consistent with Amir
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et al. (2011) and Chuk (2010), due to a shift from equities to bonds, I find an increase in
the pricing multiple for bonds from the pre- to post- period and a corresponding decrease
in the pricing multiple for equities. I conclude from these results that the capital markets
recognize a difference between recognition and disclosure, giving more weight to
information that is recognized than to information that is disclosed.

CONCLUSIONS
In conclusion, the results of this study suggest that, for U.S. firms, in the years 20032011, the securities markets found incremental information content in the composition of
pension assets as provide by SFAS 132R and SFAS 158. Consistent with the findings of
Barth et al. (1993), I find that for SVC, DEFRET and ATRANS the explanatory value of
these pension costs becomes redundant once pension balance sheet variables are
included. Consistent with prior literature, pension assets are not viewed as the property of
the firm but pension deficits (pension liabilities and pension costs) are viewed as firm
debts. During the Financial Crisis of 2008-09, managers of pension funds reduced
investments in equity and increased investments in bonds. This may be due to pressures
of recognition or because they were seeking less risky investments in a time of economic
downturn. In addition, I find evidence that investors assign more significance to pension
accounting information that is recognized in the financial statements than to pension
information that is disclosed.
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IV. ACCRUALS AND THE PREDICTION OF FUTURE CASH FLOWS
PRIOR LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESE DEVELOPMENT
This study investigates the role of accruals in predicting future cash flows, using the
market value of equity as a proxy for future cash flows. Prior pension research has shown
that: (1) pension assets are not considered as property of the firm (Barth, et al., 1993); (2)
despite pension assets not being viewed by investors as property of the firm, equities, the
largest class of pension assets, is correlated with future returns (Amir and Benartzi,
1998); (3) pension liabilities are, however, viewed as belonging to the firm (Barth et al.,
1992); and (4) pension income statement information can often be redundant when
presented with pension balance sheet information (Barth et al., 1993). As noted by Amir
and Benartzi (1998), pension returns are economically significant and lead to higher
overall rates of return for the firm.
The model used in Barth et al., (2001a), is based on the Modified Jones Model
(Dechow et al., 1995) [DSS] for nondiscretionary accruals in event year t:
=∝

+ ∝ (∆

− ∆

)+∝ (

)

(1)

where:
= total Assets at t–1;
∆

= annual change in revenues in year t scaled by total assets at t-1;

∆

= the annual change in net receivables in year t scaled by total assets at
t-1;
= the gross property plant and equipment in year t scaled by total assets
at t-1.
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Estimates of the firm-specific parameters, ∝ , ∝ , and ∝

are generated using the

following model in the estimation period:
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where:
∆

= the annual change in current assets;

∆

= the annual change in current liabilities;

∆

ℎ

∆

= the annual change in cash and cash equivalents;
= the annual change in debt included in current liabilities;
= depreciation and amortization expense; and
= total assets.

BCN disaggregates earnings into its major components:
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where:
= cash flow from operations;
∆
∆
∆

= the period-to-period change in accounts receivables;

,
,
,

= the period-to-period change in inventory;
= the period change in accounts payable;

5

I regress annually, based on one-digit SIC codes. I am unable to run annual regressions based on 2-digit
SIC codes due to data limitations. However, the fixed effects regressions, employed in determining the
associations between accruals and future cash flows, should control for industry effects.
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= depreciation expense;

,
,

= amortization expense; and

,

= the aggregate of other accruals.6

Following Barth et al. (2001a) and Nam et al. (2012), I designate the market value of
equity [MVE] as a proxy for the present value of all future cash flows. My benchmark
model is thus:
=∝ +∝
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As per Nam et al. (2012), I combine
variable

,

,

and

,

into a single

, representing depreciation and amortization expenses. My deflator

is total assets.
Since BCN (2001a) finds that aggregate components of prior cash flows and accruals
mask information relevant for predicting future cash flows, disaggregating prior cash
flows and accruals in their major components will increase investors’ ability to predict
future cash flows. As per BCN (2001a), I predict that the pricing multiples on ChAP will
be negative and that the pricing multiples on ChINV and ChAR will be positive. Given
that depreciation and amortization are intended to match the costs of long-term assets and
that firms presumably purchase these assets in order to increase cash flows, if matching is
achieved between capital expenditures and their associated depreciation/amortization, the
pricing multiple on DEPAMOR will reflect the expected positive return and be greater
6

OTHER = EARN - (CF + ΔAR + ΔINV – ΔAP – DEPR – AMORT), where Earn is net income before
extraordinary items
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than zero. This should hold even if the return is lower than the firms’ cost of capital. My
first hypothesis (in the alternative form) is thus:
H1: Since the various components of accruals capture different information about
delayed cash flows and future expected cash flows, the securities markets will assign
different pricing multiples to the components of accruals.
Value relevance studies like this one, are designed to determine which particular
accounting amounts contain information that is used by investors to determine firms’
value (Barth et al., 2001b). In pension value relevance research, prior studies have tried to
determine whether investors view pension funds as belonging to the firm, and if so,
which pension components do investors view as relevant in determining firms’ market
value (Daley, 1984; Landsman, 1986; Barth et al., 1992; Amir, 1996; Amir and Benartzi,
1998; Barth et al.; 2001a; Barth et al., 2001b, just to name a few). Some have used a
balance sheet approach and some have used an income statement approach. It was not
until 1995, when Ohlson introduced the clean surplus model that pension research took
into consideration both balance sheet and income statement measures simultaneously.
The first model is the Daley (1984) cross-sectional equity model which uses an
income statement approach by regressing the after-tax earnings before pension costs and
after-tax pension costs on the market value of equity.
MVEit = α + β1 EbPCit + β2 PCit + ε

(7)

Where:
EbPC

= after-tax earnings before pension costs; and

PC

= after-tax pension costs.

Daley concludes that pension expense may be impounded into equity prices.
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Continuing with an income statement approach, Barth et al. (1992) explore whether
the market assigns different pricing multiples to disaggregated pension cost components.
They use an expanded version of equation (7) which takes into account SFAS 87
requirement to decompose pension costs into four components.7 Their model takes the
following form:
MVE = α + β1 EbPCit + β2 INTit + β3 SVCit + β4 RPLNAit + β5 DEFRETit
+ β5 ATRANSit + ε

(8)

where:
INT

= interest cost;

SVC

= service cost;

RPLNA

= the expected return on plan assets;

DEFRET = the deferred return on plan assets;
ATRANS = the amortization of the transition asset; and
EbPC is as defined as above.
Not only do they find that investors assign different price multiples to the pension cost
components (although they find the pricing multiple on ATRANS is not significantly
different from zero), they argue that the generally larger price multiples on pension
income streams when compared to the price multiples of non-pension income streams
supports the idea that investors view pension income as less risky than other income.

7

Barth et al., (1992) further decompose TAMOR into DEFRET and ATRANS. Appendix A describes how
to calculate these amounts and the relationship of the variables to each other.
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Landsman (1986), by dividing assets and liabilities into pension and non-pension
components, was the first to use the balance sheet approach in assessing the information
content of pension accounting. The basic form of his model is:
MVE = α + β1 NPAit + β2 NPLit + β3 PLAit + β4 PLit + ε

(9)

where:
NPA

= non-pension assets;

NPL

= non-pension liabilities;

PLA

= plan assets; and

PL

= plan liabilities.

He also finds significant pricing multiples on pension assets and liabilities, and concludes
that the securities markets value disclosed pension assets and liabilities similarly to
recognized assets and liabilities.
Building on the idea that accounting standards prevent the market value of equity
from equaling the book value of equity (non-recognition of intangible assets such as
those which are internally-generated and the incorporation of historical values which
mask current market values), based on Ohlson (1995), Glaum (2009) explains how most
subsequent pension studies have captured book value as reflected in abnormal earnings in
the following model:
MVE = α + β1 NPEit + β2 EbPCit + β3 PLAit + β4 PLit + β4 PCit + ε
where:
NPE

= owner’s equity plus pension liabilities;

EbPC

= earnings before pension costs;

PLA

= plan assets;
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(10)

PL

= plan liabilities; and

PC

= pension costs.

Employing this model we can see, for the first time, whether pension balance sheet
information and pension income information are related to a firm’s market value and how
they relate to each other, although in an efficient market, the model is over specified
(Glaum, 2009). If, for instance, fair values are measured with sufficient reliability, then
there will be no intangibles attached to them, and/or there are no synergies with other
corporate assets and liabilities.
Barth et al. (1993), by decomposing the elements of pension disclosures into their
various components, is the first study to employ the Ohlson model in exploring how
investors value pension information, in particular, the relationship between balance sheet
and income information There model is:
MVE = α + β1 Assetit + β2 Liabilities + β3 EbPCit + β4 PLAit + β5 PLit + β6 INTit
+ β7 SVCit + β8 RPLNAit + β9 DEFRETit + β9 ATRANSit + ε
where:
Asset

= the firm’s assets;

Liabilities = the firms’ liabilities;
EbPC

= net income before pension costs;

PLA

= plan assets;

PL

= plan liabilities;

INT

= interest cost;

SVC

= service cost;

RPLNA

= the actual rate of return on plan assets;
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(11)

DEFRET = the deferred return on plan assets; and
ATRANS = the amortization of the transition asset.
They find that when pension balance sheet data is known, pension income statement data
becomes redundant, i.e., it provides no additional information.
Based on the previous literature, my second hypothesis (in alternative form) is:
H2: Investors view pension liabilities as being liabilities of the firm, thus pension
liabilities will be negatively associated with expected future cash flows.
Barth et al. (1993) find that pension balance sheet and income data information are so
correlated that no additional information is provided by the income statement data once
the balance sheet data is known. Therefore, my third hypothesis (in the alternative form)
is:
H3: Including both balance sheet information and income statement information in a
single model will cause over-specification of the model. Thus most or all of the pension
cost components will be redundant and not associated with expected future cash flows.
Amir and Benartzi (1998) examine whether expected rates of return (ERR) and the
percentage of pension assets invested in various classes of assets are correlated with
future returns on pension assets and conclude that the percentage invested in equities is
correlated with future returns. They find that ERR and the percentage of plan assets
invested in equities are weakly correlated, and that only the percentage invested in equity
is correlated with future pension returns. Asthana (2008) looks at the role of expected rate
of return on pension assets under SFAS 87. Their data suggests that managers may inflate
earnings per share (when they are going to miss earnings expectations) by inflating ERR
and that this inflation is directly tied to the amount by which earnings will miss the target
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and to earnings sensitivity. Given that pension returns are economically significant (for
my dataset, on average, return on pension plans comprises about 61% of earnings), I
expect managers to manage earnings by shifting the composition of the investment of the
pension assets. I also expect managerial signaling/earnings management during the 20082009 financial crisis, will result in changes in both the magnitude and sign of the pricing
multiples during that period. My fourth, fifth and sixth hypotheses (in the alternative
form) are thus:
H4: Given that pension returns are economically significant for many firms and plan
sponsors with more equity securities would employ higher expected rates of return, the
percentage of pension assets invested in equities will be positively correlated with future
expected cash flows.
H5: Managers will signal/manage earnings using accruals during the 2008-2009
financial crisis. This will result in changes in the pricing multiples of various components
of pension assets during the recent financial crisis.
H6: During recent financial crisis, a flight of capital from equities will result in a
negative association between investments in equities and future cash flows.
Finally, I examine how the impact of accounting information on future cash flows
may differ with the information is disclosed rather than recognized. Kimbrough (2007)
studies financial statement recognition and analyst coverage and finds them to be
associated with firm value. Davis-Friday et al., (1999) study whether financial statement
data is valued differently by financial markets if it is disclosed in the footnotes rather than
recognized in the body of the financial statements. Using several valuations tests, they
find that information that is recognized receives more weight than that which is disclosed.
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The format with which information is presented also impacts the pricing multiples nonprofessional investors place on that information (Maines and MacDonald, 2000).
Specifically, they find that information on the volatility of unrealized gains is only taken
into consideration by non-professionals when that information is formally presented in a
statement of comprehensive income. Lehavy et al., (2011) analyze the complexity and
readability of 10-K filings and find that “less readable 10-Ks are associated with greater
dispersion, lower accuracy, and greater overall uncertainty in analyst earnings forecasts”
(p. 1087), while Hodder, et al. (2008) find that something as simple as the structure of the
indirect method of presenting operating cash flows can impede users’ information
processing. My final hypothesis (stated in the alternative) is thus:
H7: The change in presentation from disclosure to recognition, will be associated
with different (greater) pricing multiples on pension assets/liabilities/ costs and accruals
in the pre- versus post-SFAS 158 periods.

SAMPLE AND RESEARCH DESIGN
Financial and pension data were collected from Compustat (Fundamentals and
Pension Annual) while security prices were collected from CRSP. The sample firms were
required to be U.S. firms with defined benefit pension plans, that had total assets greater
than pension assets, and with complete financial and pension data available for three
consecutive years.8 These screens resulted in 6,506 firm years for 1,098 individual firms.
The data is collected for the period 2003 through 2011, a period in which firms were

8

Necessary to calculate lags
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required to disaggregate the composition of their pension assets and costs. Since I study
the same cross-sectional unit (in this case, firms) over time, I employ panel data
regression of the balance sheet models for accruals. According to Baltagi (1998, p.7),
panel data gives “more informative data, more variability, less collinearity among
variables, more degrees of freedom and more efficiency” while taking heterogeneity
explicitly into account. Pooled Ordinary Least Squares Regression often camouflages the
heterogeneity (uniqueness) that may exist among firms, i.e., the individuality of each firm
is subsumed in the disturbance term εt (Gujarati, 2003). I run a Hausman test and
determine a fixed effects model fits the data better than a random effects model. One of
the advantages of a fixed-effects model is the ability to control for all time-invariant
differences between individual firms, so that the models cannot be biased because of
omitted time-invariant characteristics such as industry.
Combining the BCN balance sheet models of accruals (equations (5) and (6)) with the
Ohlson Clean Surplus model (10) and the BBL model (11), my models for investigating
whether aggregate pension components partially mask information related to future cash
flows are:
MVEt = β0 + β1 NPEt -1 + β2 EbPCt -1 + β3 PAt -1 + β4 PCt -1 + β5 PLiabt -1 + β6 ACCt -1
+ β7 AssetTurnt – 1 + β8 FinCrisist – 1 + β11 Fin_PAt – 1 + β12 Fin_PCt – 1
+ β13 Fin_ACCt -1 + ε

(12)

and

MVEt = β0 + β1 NPEt -1 + β2 EbPCt -1 + β3 Bondst -1 + β4 Equityt -1 + β5 RealEstatet -1
+ β6 OtherAssetst -1 + β7 SVCt -1 + β8 INTt -1 + β9 DEFRETt -1 + β10 RPLNAt -1
+ β11 ATRANSt -1 + β12 PLiab t – 1 + β13 ChARt -1 + β14 ChINVt -1 + β15 ChAPt -1
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+ β16 DEPAMORt -1 + β17 OtherACCt -1 + β18 AssetTurnt – 1 + β19 FinCrisist – 1
+ β20 Fin_Bondst -1 + β21 Fin_Equityt -1 + β22 Fin_RealEstatet -1
+ β23 Fin_OtherAssetst -1 + β24 Fin_SVCt -1 + β25 Fin_ INTt -1
+ β26 Fin_ DEFRETt -1 + β27 Fin_RPLNAt -1 + β28Fin_ ATRANSt -1
+ β29 Fin_ChARt – 1 + β30 Fin_ChINVt – 1 + β31 Fin_ChAPt – 1
+ β32 Fin_DEPAMORt – 1 + β33 Fin_OtherACCt – 1 + ε

(13)

where:
MVE

= Fiscal year-end market value of common equity at time t or t-1;

NPE

= Owner’s equity plus net pension liabilities;

EbPC

= Earnings before extraordinary items before pension costs;

PA

= Pension assets: Equity + Bonds + RealEstate + OtherAssets;

Equity

= Pension assets invested in equities;

Bonds

= Pension assets invested in bonds;

RealEstate

= Pension assets invested in real estate;

OtherAssets

= Pension assets not invested in equities, bonds, or real estate;

PLiab

= Market value of firm’s pension debt;

PC

= Pension costs: SVC + INT + DEFRET + RPLNA + ATRANS;

SVC

= Pension service costs;

INT

= Pension interest costs;

DEFRET

= Deferred return on plan assets;

RPLNA

= Actual return on plan assets;

ATRANS

= Amortization of the transition asset;

ACC

= Accruals: NI before extraordinary items net of extraordinary
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items/discontinued operations that affect cash flows;
ChAR

= Change in accounts receivable;

ChINV

= Change in inventories;

ChAP

= Change in accounts payable;

DEPAMOR

= Depreciation and amortization expense;

OtherACC

= Other accruals: ACC – (ChAR + ChINV – ChAP +DEPAMOR);

AssetTurn

= Sales divided by total asset;

FinCrisis

= 1 for years 2007, 2008, 2009, 0 otherwise;

Fin_PA

= Interaction between FinCrisis and PA;

Fin_Bonds

= Interaction between FinCrisis and Bonds;

Fin_Equity

= Interaction between FinCrisis and Equity;

Fin_RealEstate= Interaction between FinCrisis and RealEstate;
Fin_OtherAssets= Interaction between FinCrisis and OtherAssets;
Fin_PLiab

= Interaction between FinCrisis and PLiab;

Fin_PC

= Interaction between FinCrisis and PC;

Fin_SVC

= Interaction between FinCrisis and SVC;

Fin_INT

= Interaction between FinCrisis and INT;

Fin_DEFRET = Interaction between FinCrisis and DEFRET;
Fin_RPLNA = Interaction between FinCrisis and RPLNA;
Fin_ATRANS = Interaction between FinCrisis and ATRANS;
Fin_ACC

= Interaction between FinCrisis and ACC;

Fin_ChAR

= Interaction between FinCrisis and ChAR;

Fin_ChINV

= Interaction between FinCrisis and ChINV;
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Fin_ChAP

= Interaction between FinCrisis and ChAP;

Fin_DEPAMOR= Interaction between FinCrisis and DEPAMOR;
Fin_OtherACC= Interaction between FinCrisis and OtherACC; and
Fin_AssetTurn = Interaction between FinCrisis and AssetTurn

RESULTS
The descriptive statistics for 2004-2011 are presented in Table 7. The sample spans
2002-2011 because the analysis relies on at least one year of future market value of
equity and at least one year of change in accruals. It spans 2003-2011 because
decomposition of pension assets was only required under FAS 132R and SFAS 158. The
accrual components are calculated from balance sheet data. Following Sloan (1996), all
variables are deflated by average total assets. The sample excludes financial services
firms (SIC codes 6000-6999) because the model is not designed to reflect their activities
(Barth et al., 2001a). Overall, although the use of individual components of pension
assets, pension costs and accruals may help to increase prediction accuracy, the decrease
in degrees of freedom may offset the benefits for cross-sectional analysis. Given the need
to calculate lags, the results may also be affected by survivorship bias.
Table 8 contains the percentages of pension assets invested in the 4 classes of assets
as required by SFAS 132R and SFAS 158 (bonds, equity, real estate, and other assets).
Figure 2displays the annual mean percentages in graphical form. I find a decrease in the
percentage invested in equities and a corresponding increase in the percentage invested in
bonds between 2007-2008. This is consistent with managers of pension fund assets
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seeking a “safe harbor” in times of economic downturn. This shift may also, however, be
due in part to the recognition requirements imposed by SFAS 158 (Amir et al., 2010;
Fried, 2010; Chuk, 2011).
Table 9 presents the regression estimates from equations (12) and (13), which test the
association of the components of pension assets/liabilities, revenues/expenses with future
cash flows (current market value of equity) and accruals. As expected, all pricing
multiples of accruals, both aggregated and disaggregated with the exception of the
change in inventories, are significant in predicting next period cash flows. It would be
surprising if models containing accruals were not associated with future cash flows in a
superior fashion than models employing prior cash flows alone. This is because accruals
inherently contain information about future cash flows whereas prior cash flows do not.
The signs are as predicted and consistent with Barth et al. (2001a). Since inventory can
be stated in terms of the current change in revenues (Barth et al., 2001a), the insignificant
pricing multiple of the change of inventories may be due to inventory disclosures
containing redundant information. Comparing the associated R2s 9, model (13) with the
disaggregated accruals, pension assets and pension liabilities has substantially more
predictive ability than model (12) with aggregated amounts.
Assessing the association of pension information with future cash flows (model 12), I
find that none of the pricing multiples associated with pension assets (PA), pension
liabilities (PLiab), or pension costs (PC) are significant. When the components as
disaggregated into their individual components, however, we see not only an increase in
9

STATA provides three R-squares when running panel data regressions (xtreg): within, between, and
overall. Within represents the R-squared from the mean-deviated regression, i.e. the ordinary r-square from
running OLS on the transformed data and is the one reported here.
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overall predictability but also that the markets, in some cases, do assign significant
pricing multiples to the individual components. Consistent with Amir and Benartzi
(1998), investments in equities are significant to investors in predicting future cash flows.
The pricing multiple is, however, small which implies that investors do not view pension
assets as belonging to the firm. Pension liabilities are negatively associated with future
cash flows. This suggests that investors view pension liabilities as belonging to the firms.
As predicted, most pension cost pricing multiples are not significant when presented with
balance sheet information. SVC is the exception. SVC is defined by the FASB as “the
addition to the pension obligation attributable to services rendered by employees during
the period” (Barth et al., 1992). The sign is surprisingly positive. Barth et al. (1992)
found a similar result with pension service costs and posited that this may be due to some
pension costs not being viewed by the securities markets as a measure of pension
liabilities, but instead acting as a proxy for the value created by human capital. The longterm horizon of this pension cost may also be a reason for its importance to investors, as
the effects of the other pension costs have shorter lives or are susceptible to annual
changes.
The 2008-2009 financial crisis has a negative effect on future cash flows and the
pricing multiple is greater when disaggregated accounting components are used. During
the financial crisis, the model shows the predicted flight of capital (Bernanke et al., 1996;
Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2005, 2008; Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2008; and Gelos
and Wei, 2005). Real estate pension assets are also negatively associated with future cash
flows. This is a logical reaction to the sub-prime mortgage crisis. Increases in service
costs and interest costs pricing multiples during the financial crisis are significant and
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negative. The change in sign for the pricing multiple of service cost from the nonfinancial crisis period may be viewed by investors as a signal from managers that value
created by human capital declined during the period. All other pricing multiples for
pension costs are not significantly different from zero, indicating that, in the presence of
balance sheet information, the income statement information is considered redundant.
Once again, we see that investors value the incremental information contained in the
individual components of accruals during the financial crisis. Again, the change in the
sign may be due to signaling by managers. The sign of the pricing multiple on
depreciation and amortization does not, however, change during the financial crisis. This
may be due to the inability of managers to signal using a cost that is tied to the long-term
rate of return on capital assets. An increase in accounts receivables during the financial
crisis may, for example, signal that customers are slower to pay. Similarly, an increase in
inventories during the crisis may be viewed by investors as resulting from lower
inventory turnover. Similar inferences can be drawn for the change in accounts payable
and other accruals. Differences in the magnitudes of the pricing multiples on accrual
components are quite large when compared to the pricing multiples outside of the
financial crisis. The absolute value of the changes ranges from 52.4% for depreciation
and amortization expense to 181% for other accruals. This implies that investors were
more concerned with accruals during the financial crisis.
SFAS 158 does appear to have produced a significant overall change in the
predictability of future cash flows (Table 10): i.e. investors view recognized accounting
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amounts differently from disclosed amounts.10 The pricing multiples are not significantly
different form zero for individual pension asset classes but the pricing multiple for net
pension equity is significantly different in the pre- and post-periods - with a decrease in
the weight on NPE following recognition. The pricing multiple for earnings before
pension costs is also significantly lower in the post SFAS 158 period. Except for the
expected rate of return on pension assets for which the pricing multiple is smaller in the
post-SFAS period, investors view the information contained in the individual components
of pension costs as being stale when presented along with balance sheet amounts. The
same can be said of pension liabilities. There are, however, significant differences
between ChINV and ChAP for the post- and pre-SFAS periods. When comparing the R2s
of the pre- and post-SFAS 158 periods, we see that model (13), which includes
recognized accounting amounts, has substantially more predictive ability than model (12)
with disclosed accounting amounts.

ADDITIONAL TESTS
Dechow et al. (1995), [DSS], provides an alternative definition for comparing the
power of aggregated accruals. Consistent with previous studies of earnings management
(Healy 1985 and Jones, 1991), they compute total accruals (TA) as:
= ∆

− ∆

−∆

ℎ + ∆

−

10

)/ (

)

(1)

I exclude the year 2006 from this model because the year 2006 includes MVE2006 period where SFAS 158
was in effect while all other variables are for the year 2005 period when SFAS 158 was not in effect.
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Discretionary accruals are then estimated using model (2) by subtracting the predicted
level of nondiscretionary accruals (NDA) form total accruals (standardized by lagged
total assets).
=

+

(∆

− ∆

)+

(

) + νt

(2)

Future cash flows are the estimated using aggregated and disaggregated pension
components.
MVEt = β0 + β1 NPE t -1 + β2 EbPC t -1 + β3 PA t -1 + β4 PC t -1 + β5 PLiab t – 1 + β6 DA t -1
+ β7 NDA t -1 + β8 AssetTurnt – 1 + β9 FinCrisis t – 1 + β10 Fin_PA t - 1
+ β11 Fin_PCt – 1 + β12 Fin_DA t – 1 + β13 Fin_NDA t – 1 + ε

(14)

MVEt = β0 + β1 NPE t -1 + β2 EbPC t -1 + β2 Bonds t -1 + β3 Equity t -1 + β4 Real Estate t -1
+ β5 Other Assets t -1 + β6 SVC t -1 + β7 INT t -1 + β8 DEFRET t -1 + β9 RPLNA t -1
+ β10 ATRANS t -1 + β11 PLiab t – 1 + β12 DA t -1 + β13 NDA t -1 + β14 AssetTurnt – 1
+ β15 FinCrisis t – 1 + β16 Fin_Bonds t -1 + β17 Fin_Equity t – 1
+ β18 Fin_RealEstate t – 1 + β19 Fin_OtherAssetst – 1 + β20 Fin_SVC t -1
+ β21 Fin_ INTt -1 + β22Fin_ DEFRETt-1 + β23 Fin_RPLNA t -1
+ β24Fin_ ATRANS t -1 + β25 Fin_DA t – 1 + β26 Fin_NDA t – 1 + ε

(15)

where:
DA

= discretionary accruals as calculated by the Modified Jones Model;

NDA = nondiscretionary accruals as calculated by the Modified Jones Model;
and all other variables are as previously specified. The results of these tests are presented
in Table 11.
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Comparing the R2s with the R2s obtained using Model (12) and Model (13), we see
the incremental information contained in the individual components of accruals as
defined by BCN increase the predictability of future cash flows when compared to the
discretionary and nondiscretionary accruals employed in DSS.
Using aggregate accounting amounts for pension assets and costs, Model (14)
indicates that investors value pension disclosures by assigning differing pricing multiples
to pension assets, liabilities and costs. The pricing multiple of pension assets is
significant and small, consistent with investors, while valuing the incremental
information of pension assets, choosing not to treat those pension assets as belonging to
firms. The pricing multiple on pension costs is not statistically different from zero. This is
consistent with the information provided by pension costs being redundant when
presented with balance sheet information. The large significant pricing multiple on
pension liabilities is consistent with investors viewing pension liabilities as belonging to
the firm and thus, of help in predicting future cash flows.
Turning to the incremental information derived from disaggregating pension assets
and costs into their individual components, we see similar results to the BCN Model (13).
I find larger pricing multiples in this model when compared to BCN. The significance
and magnitude of the pricing multiple on equities indicates that investors value the
amount of pension assets invested in equities, but do not view these pension assets as
belonging to the firm. As above, pension liabilities are viewed as belonging to firms and
their power in predicting future cash flows increases when pension components are
disaggregated. As in BCN, only service costs are valued by investors in predicting future
cash flows.
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Aggregated

accounting

amounts

mask

the

effect

of

discretionary

and

nondiscretionary accruals. The pricing multiples for discretionary and nondiscretionary
accruals are insignificant in the Model (14) which uses aggregated pension amounts.
Consistent with prior literature (Subramanyam, 1996 and Bowen et al., 1987), however,
(and assuming that the modified Jones model is able to correctly decompose total
accruals

into

discretionary

and

nondiscretionary

accruals)

discretionary

and

nondiscretionary accruals have incremental value for investors in predicting future cash
flows (Model 15). The pricing multiples on discretionary and nondiscretionary accruals
are 36.188 and 0.001 respectively. Unlike Subramanyam (1996), however, the weight
attached to discretionary accruals is much greater than the weight attached to
nondiscretionary accruals. This indicates investors are assigning greater importance to the
discretionary information being supplied by managers about future earnings.11
Once again, the 2008-2009 financial crisis has a negative association with future cash
flows, although the multiple is higher in this model than in BCN. As with BCN, the
model shows a flight of capital (Bernanke et al., 1996; Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2005,
2008; Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2008 and Gelos and Wei, 2005) for equities and real
estate assets. The increase in the pricing multiple for service costs during the financial
crisis is significant and negative as before. Surprisingly, interest costs have a large
significant positive pricing multiple. This may be caused by a correlation in balance sheet
and income statement pension information. As before; other pricing multiples for pension

11

An alternative explanation is that this result may be due to measurement error arising from
misspecification of the cross-sectional Modified Jones model (discretionary accruals may be contaminated
with nondiscretionary components).
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costs are not significantly different from zero, indicating the information is considered
stale.
Looking at the effect of the financial crisis on accruals, the multiple on Fin_DA and
Fin_NDA are similar in magnitude and sign to those in Model (14). This may signify that
disaggregating pension assets and costs had little effect on the interaction between the
financial crisis and accruals.
As in BCN, SFAS 158 does appear to have produced a significant overall change in
the predictability of future cash flows (Table 12): i.e. investors view recognized
accounting amounts differently from disclosed amounts. As with BCN, the differences in
pricing multiples on pension assets in the pre-and post-SFAS 158 periods are not
significant but the pricing multiple for net pension equity (which is adjusted for the effect
of pensions) is significantly different in the pre- and post- periods. The pricing multiple
for earnings before pension costs is significantly lower in the post-SFAS 158 period
when compared to the pre-SFAS 158 period. The pricing multiple for expected rate of
return on pension assets decreases (meaning a smaller weight in the post-SFAS 158
period) while the pricing multiple for service costs increases. There is no significant
change in the information provided by pension liabilities. With respect to discretionary
and nondiscretionary accruals, there are significant differences in nondiscretionary
accruals while there is no significant change in the information provided by discretionary
accruals. This is due to the rather large standard deviations associated with discretionary
accruals when compared to comparably smaller standard deviations associated with
nondiscretionary accruals. When comparing the R2s of the pre- and post-SFAS 158
periods, we see that model (13) with recognized accounting amounts has substantially
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more predictive ability than model (12) with disclosed accounting amounts. Thus, we
conclude investors value recognized accounting information differently from disclosed
accounting information.

CONCLUSIONS
Consistent with Barth et al. (2001a), the results of this study suggest that, for U.S.
firms, in the years 2003-2011, aggregate accounting amounts mask how the components
of earnings affect investors’ ability to predict future cash flows. Disaggregating pension
earnings components and accruals results in an increase in predictive power. Each accrual
component, with the exception of change in inventories, reflects different information
relating to future cash flows. Consistent with Amir and Benartzi (1998), the pricing
multiple on equities, the largest class of pension assets, is significant and positive. During
the 2008-2009 financial crisis, investors placed a greater weight on the incremental
information contained in the individual components of accruals. The change in the sign
and magnitude of the effect of the accrual components may be the result of signaling by
managers. The sign of depreciation and amortization does not, however, change during
the financial crisis and may be due the inability of managers to signal using a cost that is
tied to the long-term rate of return on capital assets. The inferences are robust to
alternative specifications of accruals. In addition, I find evidence that investors assign
more significance to pension accounting information that is recognized in the financial
statements than to pension information that is disclosed.
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V. FUNDED STATUS OF PENSION PLANS IN THE U.S
PRIOR LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESE DEVELOPMENT
In my final study, I examine the association between funding status and the market
value of equity. With the recognition of actuarial gains and losses in comprehensive
income, rates of return on pension assets have an economically significant impact on the
book value of equity.

12

Funding status may also an impact on cash flows. Under the

Employee Retirement Income Security ACT (ERISA) of 1974, firms with private
employer-sponsored DB plans funded from 80 to 90 percent of pension obligations, may
have to accelerate cash contributions to the plan. Accelerated cash contributions are
unconditionally required if the funding rate is below 80 percent (Coronado and Sharpe,
2003). The U.S. Pension Protection Act (2006) requires full funding status within 7 years
(Amir et al., 2010). Therefore, pension funding, and the required cash to bring plans to
funded status, may have a large impact on the value shareholders place on the sponsoring
firm’s equity. I find that investors reward firms that have fully funded pension plans with
higher market values as compared to firms with underfunded plans. I also find that the
capital markets perceive larger firms to have higher levels of risk with respect to pension
liabilities, i.e., underfunded pension plans are more negatively associated with market
values for larger firms as compared to smaller firms.
Prior literature has found that pension funding levels have an impact on pension asset
allocations (Bader, 1991; Amir and Benartzi, 1998, 1999; Chuk, 2011; Amir et al., 2010;
Fried, 2010). This research suggests that companies invest more in bonds while
12

For an example of the magnitude of this impact, on average, amounts equal to 61% of net income for the
firms in this sample are provided by returns on pension assets.
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decreasing investments in equities as a means of avoiding contributions to pension plans
when cash flows are low (Friedman,1983; Bodie et al., 1984; Amir et al., 2010). My
research adds to the literature by finding that firms with underfunded plans are rewarded
by capital markets for investing in bonds rather than equities. The switch from equities
may also, however, be tied to SFAS 158 and its required recognition of the asset and
income components of pension plans.
Barth et al. (1992) developed a model to investigate whether market participants
assign different pricing multiples to pension cost components when determining security
prices. Using an income approach, they use an expanded version of the Daley (1984)
model which includes pension costs decomposed into the various components required
by SFAS 87. Their model takes the following form:
MVE = α + β1 EbPCit + β2 INTit + β3 SVCit + β4 RPLNAit + β5 DEFRETit
+ β5 ATRANSit + ε

(1)

where INT is interest cost, SVC is service cost, RPLNA is expected return on plan assets,
DEFRET is the deferred return on plan assets, ATRANS is the amortization of the
transition asset and EbPC is earnings before pension costs. They find that investors assign
different price multiples to the pension cost components (although they find the pricing
multiple on ATRANS is not significantly different from zero). The pricing multiples on
pension income streams are generally larger than the price multiples of non-pension
income streams. They argue that this supports the idea that investors view pension
income as less risky than other income.
Landsman (1986) was the first to use the balance sheet approach in assessing the
information content of pension accounting. Based on the accounting equation that equity
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is equal to assets minus liabilities, he divides the assets and liabilities into pension and
non-pension components. The basic form of his equation is:
MVE = α + β1 NPAit + β2 NPLit + β3 PLAit + β4 PLit + ε

(2)

where NPA is non-pension assets, NPL is non-pension liabilities, PLA is plan assets and
PL is plan liabilities. He finds significant pricing multiples on pension assets and
liabilities, and concludes that the securities markets value disclosed pension assets and
liabilities similarly to recognized assets and liabilities.
Barth et al. (1993) is the first pension study to employ the Ohlson (1995) Clean
Surplus model which combines both balance sheet and income statement information.
Barth et al. (1993) [BBL] examine how investors value pension information. Using this
model BBL examine the relationship between balance sheet and income statement
information by decomposing the elements of pension disclosures into their various
components.
MVE = α + β1 Assetit + β2 Liabilities + β3 EbPCit + β4 PLAit + β5 PLit + β6 INTit
+ β7 SVCit + β8 RPLNAit + β9 DEFRETit + β9 ATRANSit + ε
where:
Asset

= the firm’s assets;

liabilities

= firms’ liabilities;

EbPC

= net income before pension costs;

PLA

= plan assets;

PL

= plan liabilities;

INT

= interest cost;

SVC

= service cost;
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(3)

RPLNA

= the actual rate of return on plan assets;

DEFRET

= the deferred return on plan assets; and

ATRANS

= the amortization of the transition asset.

They find that when pension balance sheet data is known, pension income statement data
becomes redundant, i.e., it provides no additional information.
Building on BBL, Weidman and Wier (2004), examine the role of the funded
status of pensions, in explaining market values. They computed the funded status (FS) as
PENASSET less PENLIAB. They find that investors appear to find the deficit arising
from underfunded plans as a liability of the firm, but any surplus arising from overfunded plans is not view as an asset of the firm. Their basic equation is:
MVE = α + β1 Assetit + β2 Liabilities + β3 EbPCit + β4 FSit + β5 OVERit
+ β6 FS*OVERit + ε

(4)

where:
FS

= pension assets less pension liabilities;

OVER

= to 1 when the funded status of the plan is positive (0 otherwise); and

FS*OVER = the interaction between OVER and FS.
Assets and Liabilities are not adjusted for pension plans as in BBL, while EbPC is
defined as in BBL. Instead of over-funded pension plans, I chose to directly examine the
effect of underfunded plans by using the indicator variable, UNDER which is equal to 1
when the funded status of the plan is underfunded (0 otherwise).
My first and second hypotheses (in the alternative) are:
H1: Investors will view deficits in funding as liabilities belonging to the firm.
H2: Investors will encourage firms with underfunded plans to become funded.
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Gopalakrishnan and Sugrue (1993) examine the relationship between the projected
benefit obligation (PBO) and MVE. They note that during the early stages of the pension
policy promulgation process, the FASB favored PBO, instead of the accumulated benefit
obligation [ABO] as the appropriate measure of pension liability. However, when SFAS
87 was issued, the FASB settled for the recognition of a “minimum liability” on the
balance sheet (when ABO exceeds the fair value of plan assets). Gopalakrishnan and
Sugrue (1993) find that investors perceive PBO as a liability of the firm, consist with the
FASB’s notion (1985, para. 149) that the PBO provides a more realistic measure of the
employer’s obligations on a going concern. Their model is based on Landsman (1986),
substituting PBO for PLiab:
MVE = α + β1 Assetit + β2 Liabilities + β3 PLAit + β4 PBOit + ε

(5)

Where:
PBO = the projected benefit obligation, and all other variables are as previously
defined.
Bader (1991) tests the effect of funding policy on asset allocation and finds funding
has an inverted U-shaped relation with the percentage of pension funds allocated to
equities. He argues that firms attempt to minimize the volatility of their pension
contributions: plans that are extremely overfunded and underfunded should invest in
bonds. In determining whether expected rates of returns or the percentage of pension
assets allocated to equities is correlated with future returns on pension assets, Amir and
Benartzi (1998) state that,
It is expected, rather than the actual, return that affects reported income. For
example, an increase in ERR will cause a decrease in net pension expense, and
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hence, an increase in reported net income. Differences between the assumed and
actual returns do not enter the income statement unless they exceed a cutoff of 10
percent of the larger of PBO or the fair value of pension assets. (p.337)
They find ERR (expected earnings return on pension assets) and the percentage of
pension assets allocated to equities are related weakly and only the percentage of equity
is correlated with future returns on pension assets.
Amir and Benartzi (1999) find managers prefer fixed-income investments rather than
equity investments when they are close to recognizing an additional minimum pension
liability. Amir and Benartzi (1999) also find firms allocate their pension assets between
equities and fixed income investments to reduce volatility. Amir et al. (2009) define
pension funding status as the fair value of pension assets divided by ABO. They find after
the passage of SFAS 158, companies on average, shifted funds from equities to bonds
and that this shift is related to changes in funding levels and the expected impact of SFAS
158. Companies offset firm risk by using a more conservative pension asset allocation
(more bonds).
My third, fourth and fifth hypotheses (in the alternative) are:
H3: When pension plans are under underfunded, the market will reward more
conservative pension allocation such as investment in debt securities and fixed income
instruments.
H4: The expected rate of return on pension assets will be positively associated with
the market value of the firm.
H5: Pension income, while positively associated with the market value of the firm,
will not be perceived as belonging to the firm.
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With the passage of SFAS 132R, pension asset allocations must be disclosed. The
FASB requires pension assets be allocated to four classifications: bonds13; equity
securities; real estate; and other assets. Other assets are the amounts not invested in
equities, bonds or real estate and include hedge fund assets. Prior studies find that
managers may be inclined to divest equities and invest in bonds in order to reduce the
likelihood of making cash contributions to their pension plans when the plans are
extremely underfunded or overfunded (Friedman, 1983; Bodie et al., 1984; Amir et al.,
2009).
Given this shift in pension asset allocation, I expect that investing in equities will be
negatively associated with firm value. Larger firms generally have higher operating risk
and may be unable to offset the risk represented by underfunded pension plans. Small
changes in pension assumptions (expected rate of return, service costs, etc.) and pension
asset allocation can produce a large impact on the firm’s net income. This is especially
true for firms possessing large pension funds (Amir et al., 1998, demonstrate this using
American Airlines). I expect the market will recognize that the risks associated with
unfunded pension plans will less detrimental to the market value of equity for smaller
firms when compared to larger firms.
I examine the relationship between market value of equity and the allocation of
pension asserts to see if investors reward a shift from equities to other investments and
add to the literature that examines whether the method of accounting presentation
(recognition vs. disclosure) affects pension asset allocation. I expect the pricing multiple
13

The amount invested in fixed income securities, cash and short-term securities, U.S. government and
government agency securities, corporate bonds and notes, and mortgages.
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on investments in equities to be negative. My sixth and seventh hypotheses (in the
alternative form) are thus:
H6: Investors will reward firms who invest their pension assets more conservatively
(i.e. investment in equities will be negatively associated with firm value).
H7: Due to the associated risks of managing large pension funds and the potential
impact on net income, smaller firms will be perceived as being better able to handle the
risk associated with underfunded pension plans.
Finally, the financial crisis of 2008-2009 was in large part caused by the collapse of
the sub-prime mortgage market. With total expected write-downs on global exposures
being estimated at about $4 trillion, I expect the financial crisis to have a negative impact
on firms. I also expect investors will want mangers to focus more on core operations as
opposed to the funded status of pensions. My final hypotheses (in the alternative) are
thus:
H8: During the Financial Crisis, investments of pension assets in real estate will be
negatively associated with firm value.
H9: Investors will want managers to focus on increasing core operations. As a result,
firms with underfunded pension plans will be less penalized during the financial crisis.
H10: Investors will want managers to focus on increasing core operations. As a result,
investors will discourage firms from becoming funded during the financial crisis.

SAMPLE AND RESEARCH DESIGN
Financial and pension data were collected from Compustat (Fundamentals Annual
and Pension Annual) while security prices were collected from CRSP. The sample firms
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were required to be U.S. firms with defined benefit pension plans that had complete
financial and pension data available. These screens resulted in 6,226 firm years for 1,170
individual firms. The data cover the period 2003 through 2011, a period in which firms
were required to 1) disclose and then later to 2) recognize the composition of their
pension assets and costs. Since I study the same cross-sectional unit (in this case, firms)
over time, I employ a panel data regression of the Ohlson clean surplus model (5).
According to Baltagi (1998, p.7), panel data gives “more informative data, more
variability, less collinearity among variables, more degrees of freedom and more
efficiency” while taking heterogeneity explicitly into account. Pooled Ordinary Least
Squares Regression often camouflages the heterogeneity (uniqueness) that may exist
among firms, i.e., the individuality of each firm is subsumed in the disturbance term εt
(Gujarati, 2003). I run a Hausman test and determine a fixed effects model fits the data
better than a random effects model. One of the advantages of a fixed-effects model is the
ability to control for all time-invariant differences between individual firms, so that the
models cannot be biased because of omitted time-invariant characteristics such as
industry.
Extending Barth et al. (1993), and Weidman and Wier (2004), I regress market value
of equity on disaggregated pension asset allocation as required by SFAS 132R and SFAS
158. Pension assets are classified into 4 classes: bonds, equities, real estate and other
assets (which include hedge funds, mortgage-backed securities, and private placement).
Table 13 presents the percentages of asset classifications by year. Figure 3 plots the
classifications graphically. Overall, stocks and bonds comprise between 91.2% and
94.4% of total pension funds.
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As in Weidman and Wier (2004), I examine whether funded status has value for
investors and whether market value is more strongly associated with stock price for
underfunded plans than for over-funded plans. I expect investors to reward firms that are
funded and to encourage firms that are underfunded to become funded. This is consistent
with firms viewing pension liabilities as belonging to the firm.
Since Barth et al. (1993) find that no additional information may be provided by
income statement data when balance sheet information is presented, I limit pension cost
components to prior service costs and interest costs, which have been found to be
significant in several studies. Consistent with Barth et al. (1992), I predict the pricing
multiple will be positive for service costs (they posit it acts as a proxy for increases in
human capital). I make no prediction for interest costs.
Since the market value of equity takes into account investors’ expectations for future
cash flows, I control for expected, rather than actual, returns on pension assets. As stated
by Amir and Benartzi (1998), “(i)t is the expected, rather than the actual, return that
affects reported income” (p.337). I expect a positive association with firm value for
expected returns but at the same time, I expect the pricing multiple to be smaller than the
pricing multiple for core earnings. This is consistent with investors viewing pension
earnings as not belonging to the firm.
I also seek to answer the question of whether funding levels affect pension asset
allocation. Prior research (Friedman,1983; Bodie et al., 1984; Amir et al., 2009) suggests
that companies invest more pension assets in bonds to offset high levels of risk. Investing
in bonds may also be a means of avoiding contributions to pension plans when cash flows
are low (Amir et al., 2009). Given this shift in pension asset allocation, I expect that
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investing in equities will be negatively associated with firm value. For underfunded
firms, investment in bonds will be encouraged by the market. Larger firms generally have
higher operating risk and may not be able to offset the risk represented by underfunded
pension plans (Amir et al., 2009). Thus I expect the market will recognize that the risks
associated with unfunded pension plans can be more detrimental to the market value of
large firms as compared to the market value of small firms.
I next control for the effects of the financial crisis on funding levels and pension asset
allocation. Given that a major cause of the 20008-2009 financial crisis was the collapse
of the sub-prime mortgage market, I expect investors to encourage a divestment in
pension real estate holdings. Given the need to concentrate on core operations, I expect
investors, while still rewarding firms with funded pension plans and encouraging those
firms who have unfunded plans to become funded, to focus less on funding pension plans
(the pricing multiple will become less negative).
Finally, I examine the value relevance between recognized and disclosed accounting
information. Schipper (2007, p. 304) notes: “First, because recognition is subject to
special criteria, and because SFAC No. 5 states that disclosure and recognition are not
substitutes, it is evident that disclosure and recognition are not financial reporting
alternatives—they are not intended to serve the same purpose.” I expect significant
differences pre- and post- SFAS 158 periods and that these results will be robust to
various scenarios of the timing of the financial crisis.
I test value relevance with the following equation:
MVEit = β0 + β1 NPEit + β2 EbPCit + β3 Bondsi+ β4 Equityit + β5 Real Estateit
+ β6 Other Assetsit + β7 Fundedit + β8 Underit + β9Under_Fundedit
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+ β10 Under_Bondsit + β11 SVCit + β12 INTit + β13 EXPRETit + β14 sizeit
+ β15 size_Under2it + β16 Divit + β17 FinCrisisit + β18 Fin_Bondsit + β19 Fin_Equityit
+ β20 Fin_RealEstateit + β21 Fin_OtherAssetsit + β22 Fin_Underit
+ β23 Fin_Fundedit + β24 Fin_Under_Fundedit + ε

(6)

where
MVE
NPE

= Fiscal year-end market value of common equity;
= Owner’s equity plus net pension liabilities scaled by common
shares outstanding;
EbPC
= Earnings before extraordinary items before pension costs scaled by
common shares outstanding;
Bonds
= Pension assets invested in bonds scaled by common shares
outstanding;
Equity
= Pension assets invested in equities scaled by common shares
outstanding;
RealEstate
= Pension assets invested in real estate scaled by common shares
outstanding;
OtherAssets = Pension assets not invested in equities, bonds, or real estate scaled
by common shares outstanding;
Funded
= Pension assets divided by Accumulated Benefit Obligation,
PA/ABO;
Under
= 1 if Funded < 1, 0 otherwise;
Under_Funded = Interaction term for Under and Funded;
Under_Bonds = Interaction term for Under and Bonds;
SVC
= Pension service costs scaled by common shares outstanding;
INT
= Pension interest costs scaled by common shares outstanding;
EXPRET
= Expected Return on plan Assets scaled by common shares
outstanding;
Div
= Dividends scaled by common shares outstanding;
Size
= Natural logarithm of total assets;
size_Under = Interaction term for size and Under;
FinCrisis
= If year = 2008-09, 1; 0 otherwise;
Fin_Bonds = Interaction between FinCrisis and plan assets invested in bonds;
Fin_Equity = Interaction between FinCrisis and plan assets invested in equities;
Fin_RealEstate = Interaction between FinCrisis and plan assets invested in real estate;
Fin_OtherAssets = Interaction between FinCrisis and plan assets not invested in
equities, bonds, or real estate;
Fin_Under = Interaction between FinCrisis and Under;
Fin_Funded = Interaction between FinCrisis and Funded;
Fin_Under_Funded = Interaction between FinCrisis and Under and Funded; and
N
= Number of firm years.
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RESULTS
The descriptive statistics are presented in Table 14. On average, pension funds are
funded at the 77.91%, meaning, on average, most pension funds are not fully funded for
the sample. In fact, of the 6832 firm years, 6226 represent unfunded pension plan years
(91.1% of the firm years). A closer look at the funded status of firms reveals, however,
that at the 90% and 80% funded levels, percentages of firms with unfunded pension
accounts decrease to 78.6% and 57.2%. Regression estimates are presented in Table 15.
For my model, I defined funded as being funded as plan assets divided by accumulated
benefit obligation: PA/ABO (Amir et al., 2010).
As expected, non-pension book value and non-pension earnings (NPE and EbPC) are
positively associated with market value. In regards to pension asset allocation, I find that
the market rewards firms who decrease their investment in equities, thereby more closely
aligning pension assets with pension obligations. Equities represent the largest class of
pension assets. All other pension asset pricing multiples are not significantly different
from zero.
I find the relationship between funded status and market value to be statistically
insignificant using both a linear and a non-linear (untabulated) model. Consistent with
Wiedman and Weir (2004) who find, for Canadian firms, that the funded status of
pension plans is more strongly associated with firms’ market values for underfunded
plans, I find that the market assigns a negative pricing multiple to firms with underfunded
pension plans. The pricing multiple on becoming funded (Funded) is not significant.
The market, in turn, rewards firms who seek to decrease their pension liabilities, i.e.
the pricing multiple on Under_Funded is large and positive. Under_Funded represents the
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effect of adjusting a firm’s funded status, for firms with underfunded pension plans in
comparison to firms with funded/overfunded plans that similarly increased their funded
status. The positive pricing multiple suggests that investors assign a higher pricing
multiple to firms with underfunded plans who increase their funded status when
compared to firms with funded/overfunded plans who increase their funded status.
I also find evidence that suggests, for underfunded plans, the market rewards a
reduction in risk and a decrease in volatility as evidenced by an increase in bonds for
underfunded plans. Consistent with the idea that a more conservative asset allocation
(investing more pension assets in bonds) can ensure that a minimum pension liability will
not need to be recognized (Amir, et al., 2009) as well as offset high corporate risk
(Friedman, 1983 and Bodie et al.,1984), I find that investors assign a positive pricing
multiple to firms with underfunded pension plans that invest in bonds (Under_Bonds).
This is also consistent with several prior studies (Bader, 1991; Amir and Benartzi,1998 &
1999), that find firms have an inverted-U relation between funding levels and the
percentage invested in equities (i.e. extremely underfunded/overfunded plans invest in
bonds to minimize the volatility of future pension contributions).
Consistent with Barth et al. (1992), service costs, which proxy for increases in human
capital, are positively associated with market values. Consistent with Barth et al. (1995),
pension income statement information, because of its high correlation to pension balance
sheet information, provides no additional information (the pricing multiple on INT is not
significantly different from zero).
Because of the corridor effect, which allows firms to avoid recognizing the
differences between assumed and actual returns on the income statement (unless they
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exceed a cutoff of 10 percent of the larger of the fair value of pension plans or the
projected benefit obligation), I find the expected rate of return affects reported income
and subsequently, the market value of equity (Amir and Benartzi, 1998). I also note that
while the pricing multiple on expected returns on pension plans (EXPRET) is positive
and highly significant, it is substantially smaller than the positive and significant pricing
multiple on earnings before pension costs (EbPC). This is consistent with legal
limitations on firms’ ability to access pension surpluses. A firm may not be able to fully
realize the benefits of a pension surplus, so the market does not consider the surplus to be
an asset of the firm (Wiedman and Weir, 2004).
I also find that the market perceives larger firms to have greater risk with regard to
pension liabilities, i.e. having an underfunded pension plan is more detrimental to market
value for larger firms than for smaller firms. Given the magnitude of these pricing
multiples, investors view pension liabilities (in this case, liabilities arising from
underfunded pension plans) as belonging to the firm. Given how even small changes in
pension asset allocation can lead to changes in the expected rate of return on pension
plans, which in turn leads to substantial changes in funding levels (especially for firms
with large pension to equity ratios), firm value has the expected negative association with
firm size for firms with underfunded pension plans when compared to firms that have
funded or overfunded pension plans.
Again, as expected, the financial crisis of 2008-2009 has a negative impact on the
market value of equity while dividend payout was positively associated with firm value.
One of the causes for the financial crisis of 2008-2009 was the decline of real estate
prices caused by the sub-prime mortgage crisis. As a result, increased real estate holdings
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are negatively associated with the market value of equity. It does not appear, however,
that the financial crisis had an impact on the pricing multiples of the other classes of
pension assets.
Interestingly, during the 2008-2009 financial crisis, the pricing multiple of Funded is
less negative and becoming funded for firms with underfunded plans is associated with
decreases in firm value.14 The message investors appear to be sending to firm managers is
to cover your pension obligations as best you can during the financial crisis but not at the
expense of core operations.

ADDITIONAL TESTS
Alternative Measure of Funded
In Model (1), I define Funded as plan assets divided by accumulated benefit
obligation: PA/ABO (Amir et al., 2010). Weidman and Weir (2004) define funded as
pension assets less pension liabilities. I modify their measure to reflect the percentage of
funding (100 * (1 +((PA – PBO) /PBO)).15 The results for Model (2) are given in Table
16.
Several pricing multiples in Model (2) have similar magnitudes and the same sign as I
found in Model (1) (NPE, EbPC, Equity, Under_Bonds, SVC, EXPRET, Div,
14

During the financial crisis, the combined pricing multiple (Under + Fin_Under) is -1293.12, compared to
-7881.015 (Under). For the combined pricing multiple on underfunded firms who are adjusting the funded
percentage of their pension plans during the financial crisis, the change goes from having a positive
association with firm value outside of the financial crisis (4069.536) to having a negative association with
firm value during the crisis (-1856.6).

15

For instance, if plan assets are valued at $110m, the PBO is $100m., then Funded = 100 * (1 +((PA –
PBO) /PBO)) = 100 * (1 +((110 – 100)/100)) = 100* (1.1) = 110%.

67

Fin_RealEstate). Others are insignificant (RealEstate, OtherAssets, INT, Fin_Bonds,
Fin_Equity, and Fin_OtherAssets). While the other pricing multiples generally maintain
the same sign, implying similar conclusions to those drawn by Model (1), there are some
differences between the magnitudes of the estimates for the pricing multiples. While the
explanatory ability of Model (2) is greater is greater than Model (1) (as evidenced by the
R2s), there are apparent problems with misspecifications in Model (2).
In terms of pension asset allocation, the pricing multiple on bonds is significantly
negative in Model (2). With the pricing multiples on the two largest classes of pension
assets being negatively associated with market value and no corresponding positive
pricing multiples on real estate or other pension assets, it is unclear just how investors
would prefer firms to allocate pension assets. This appears to be a misspecification of the
model.
A second problem arises with the pricing multiples on Funded2, Under2 and
Under2_Funded2. Increasing the funded percentage is positively associated with MVE (it
is insignificant in Model (1)) and the pricing multiple on Under2 is much smaller than the
pricing multiple on Under (Model (1)). The effect of becoming funded when a firm has
an underfunded pension fund becomes insignificant. Model (2) suggests that investors are
rewarding all firms who increase their funded status and penalizing all firms with
underfunded pension plans while not encouraging firms with underfunded plans to
become funded.
Other differences involve larger pricing multiples (size_Under2, FinCrisis, and
Fin_Funded2) or a smaller pricing multiple (Fin_Under_Funded2). Overall, the estimates
for Model (2 lead to the same conclusions as drawn from Model (1).
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Recognition vs. Disclosure
Using both definitions of funded, I find there is a significant difference between the
pre- and post-SFAS period. In regards to pension asset allocation, investment of pension
assets in real estate declined in value as did the effect of investing in bonds and size for
firms with underfunded pension plans. Income items, such as service costs and expected
returns for pension items, have also decreased in information content. Given the decrease
in pricing multiples and the resulting magnitudes for pension assets and income streams,
it appears that investors do not view pension assets and earnings as belonging to the firm.
Tables 17 and 18 present the results of my tests for differences between disclosure
and recognition. The decrease in the magnitude of the pricing multiples on SVC implies
that the contribution of human capital declined with recognition. The pricing multiples on
Under_Bonds, EXPRET, and size_Under also decreased significantly. These changes are
accompanied by smaller standard deviations (not tabulated), implying investors may be
more confident about the information due to recognition. Changes in the pricing
multiples of the components of pensions in the pre- and post-SFAS 158 periods imply
that recognition of pension components has permitted investors to further differentiate
between core and pension earnings. Using various simulations, Coronado and Sharpe
(2003), find large valuation errors occur for many firms when there is a failure to
differentiate between core and pension earnings. This is especially true during a period
where there is a steep decline in stock prices coupled with a drop in interest rates. As a
result of the increased differentiation of pension assets, liabilities and earnings by
investors, valuation errors may have decreased. Similar results are found using the
alternative definition of Funded in Model (2). I conclude from these results that the
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capital markets recognize a difference between recognition and disclosure, giving more
weight to information that is recognized than to information that is disclosed.

Alternative Timing of Financial Crisis
In my models, I define the financial crisis as occurring in the years 2008 and 2009 for
all classes of pension assets. However, the U.S. subprime crisis began in August 2007
and may have caused investors to treat real estate pension investments differently in 2007
when compared to other classes of assets (Model (4)). On the other hand, since the
subprime crisis had such a dramatic effect on the entire economy, perhaps the effects of
the economic downturn were being felt by all classes of pension asset investment in 2007
as well as 2008-2009 (Model (3)). I test Equation (6) under both scenarios. The results of
these tests are presented in Table 19.
Looking at the R2s, both Model (3) and Model (4) have lower explanatory value than
Model (2). In Model (3), in which the financial crisis is defined as occurring in 20072009, the effect of the financial crisis is not significantly different from zero. Since it is
implausible that the financial crisis had no significant effect on firm values given that
expected write-downs on global exposures were estimated to be $4 trillion, this would
indicate that the financial crisis is misspecified when using the years 2007-09 across all
classes of assets. All other pricing multiples have the same sign and are generally similar
in magnitude. However, the magnitude of the effect of the financial crisis on firms with
underfunded plans is about 75% less than when the financial crisis is defined as 20082009. Also, the effect of becoming funded for underfunded firms during the financial
crisis is 43% less using this alternative timing of the financial crisis. Model (4) exhibits a
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problem similar to Model (3): the pricing multiple on the financial crisis is not
significantly different from zero, with similar differences on Fin_Under and
Fin_Under_Funded. For these reasons, defining the financial crisis as occurring in 20082009 seems to present a more realistic view of the effect of the economic downturn than
do either of the alternative definitions.

CONCLUSIONS
Examining a sample of U.S. firms with defined benefit pensions plans from 20032011, this study investigates how investors view the deficit arising from under-funded
plans. I conclude that funded status does have an effect on pension asset allocation and
that investors encourage conservative pension asset allocation to mitigate firm risk
associated with underfunded pension plans. Due to the increased visibility caused by the
recognition of pension assets, liabilities and earnings, investors have rewarded firms who
have decreased their risk by allocating a smaller proportion of pension assets to equities.
During the financial crisis of 2008-2009, investors also encouraged a decrease in
investments in real estate.
Investors view deficits arising from under-funded plans as belonging to the firm.
Investors reward firms with fully or over-funded pension plans and encourage those
funds with unfunded pension plans to become funded. During the financial crisis of 20082009, while funding percentage continued to be negatively associated with market value,
being unfunded had less negative consequences for firms in terms of market value.
Becoming funded during the financial crisis was actually associated with a decrease in
firm value.
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Due to the associated risks of managing large pension funds and the potential impact
on the net income of firms, smaller firms are perceived by capital markets as being better
able to handle the risk of underfunded pension plans. The expected rate of return on
pension assets, while, positively associated with MVE, is not viewed as belonging to the
firm.
In regards to disclosure versus recognition, I find that there are significant differences
pre- and post- SFAS 158. These results are robust to various scenarios of the timing of
the financial crisis and an alternative measure of funded. As a result of the increased
differentiation between pension assets, liabilities and earnings, by investors, valuation
errors may have decreased (information content increased) as evidenced by smaller
pricing multiples on pension components coupled with smaller standard errors.

VI. DISCUSSION
This dissertation adds to the discussion of whether pension information is value
relevant. As stated by Barth et al. (2001), "An important role of accountants is to
summarize or aggregate information that might be available from other sources. Note
also that the concepts of value relevance and decision relevance differ. In particular,
accounting information can be value relevant but not decision relevant if it is superseded
by more timely information." The data suggest that investors do, in fact, value the
incremental information contained in disaggregated pension costs and assets. I find this
holds whether examining pension information by itself or in the context of accruals or
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pension funding levels. Pension information is significantly associated with the market
value of equity.
My first study adds to the literature on whether investors value balance sheet
information or income information to a greater extent. Consistent with Barth et al. (1993),
this study is one of the first to find that the explanatory value of pension cost components
is redundant once pension balance sheet items are disaggregated into their individual
components. This study also contributes to the literature because it is one of the first to
examine the effect of the incremental information provided by the disaggregation of
pension plan assets into individual investment classifications before, during, and after the
financial crisis of 2008-09. Finally, this study contributes to the literature by suggesting
that recognized accounting information is more relevant to investors than accounting
information that is disclosed.
My second study finds disaggregated pension earnings components and accruals
contain incremental information that investors value—specifically, disaggregated pension
components increase predictive powers in regards to future cash flows. Aggregate totals
mask how the components of earnings affect investors’ ability to predict future cash
flows. Signaling by managers, during the financial crisis of 2008-2009, results in a
change in the sign and magnitude of the effect of the pricing multiples of accrual
components, with investors placing a greater weight on the individual components of
accruals. Nevertheless, the sign of depreciation and amortization does not change during
the financial crisis. This is probably due to the inability of managers to signal using a
cost that is tied to the long-term rate of return on capital assets.
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My third essay deals with whether investors are paying attention to funding levels.
The period under study, 2003-2001, represents the first time funding levels were either
disclosed (SFAS 132R) or recognized (SFAS 158). I find the market rewards firms who
have funded pension plans and at the same time, rewards firms who increase their funded
levels. During the financial crisis, I find investors are more concerned with core earnings.
During this time, firms were less negatively impacted by their unfunded status and
increasing the funded level appears to decrease the market value of equity. Investors
reward conservative pension investment plans, by encouraging divestment in equities and
rewarding investment in bonds when plans are underfunded. I add to the literature by
showing that funded levels not only affect the market value of equity but pension asset
allocation. Once again, I show that pension assets are not considered as belonging to the
firm while pension liabilities (in this case, underfunded pension plans) are perceived as
belonging to the firm.
In all 3 studies, I find that there are significant differences disclosed and recognized
accounting information. These results are robust to various scenarios of the timing of the
financial crisis. Most significantly, I find that. valuation errors may have decreased
(information content increased) as evidenced by smaller pricing multiples on pension
components coupled with smaller standard errors. I find that there are significant
differences pre- and post- SFAS 158. These results are robust to various scenarios of the
timing of the financial crisis and an alternative measure of funded. This result appears to
be driven by the passage of SFAS 158.
My findings may thus be of interest to standard-setters in that I raise the question of
whether the direct increase in the quality of pension information resulting from the rule
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change (recognizing various classes of pension assets/liabilities) is of greater value than
the indirect costs (introducing volatility into the financial statements through recognizing
net surpluses/deficits and actuarial gains/losses).
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ACCOMPANYING TABLES
Table 1
Descriptive statistics for 2003-2011, variables in per-share form a
Variable
MVE
TA
TL
Earnings
AbPA
TLbPL
EbPC
PAssets
PCosts
PLiab
Bonds
Equity
RealEstate
OtherAssets
INT
SVC
RPLNA
DEFRET
ATRANS
AssetTurn
N
a

MVE
TA
TL
Earnings
AbPA
TLbPL
EbPC
PAssets
PCosts
PLiab
Equity
Bonds
RealEstate
OtherAssets
INT
SVC
RPLNA
DEFRET
ATRANS
AssetTurn
N

2003-2006
Mean
Std.
dev.
34.80
51.94
42.18
59.81
27.19
40.65
1.69
6.39
35.67
53.86
23.27
36.89
1.94
6.51
651.82 1184.86
1.47
2.72
3.93
7.55
186.61
359.36
419.70
767.85
12.93
64.71
32.58
158.28
0.42
0.70
0.19
0.28
0.73
1.47
5.59
10.35
-5.45
10.03
1.10
0.691
3191

2007
Std.
dev.
38.87
60.18
45.15
67.33
28.38
34.09
1.96
6.06
38.10
61.88
27.53
32.72
2.14
6.28
704.71 1390.9
1.27
2.34
0.85
2.10
219.21 525.03
431.83 860.09
14.82
74.89
38.85 142.52
0.41
0.69
0.16
0.28
0.59
1.21
6.50
12.70
-6.39
12.48
1.08
0.70
883
Mean

2008
Std.
dev.
25.10
45.78
44.87
72.29
29.48
34.99
0.67
6.54
39.72
68.93
27.63
32.68
0.81
6.71
515.09 915.73
-0.59
1.70
1.85
3.37
191.78 362.22
273.86 544.38
11.58
40.26
37.86 117.27
0.42
0.66
0.15
0.27
-1.35
2.64
8.84
16.17
-8.75
15.87
1.15
0.78
854
Mean

2009
Std.
dev.
31.01
52.40
44.54
73.75
27.80
33.28
1.19
3.80
39.04
69.53
25.98
31.10
1.43
4.15
549.96 954.99
1.18
2.58
1.82
3.17
204.19 364.12
295.21 594.98
9.20
32.20
41.37 124.66
0.42
0.65
0.14
0.28
0.50
1.68
5.36
13.21
-5.23
13.03
0.99
0.68
827
Mean

Fiscal year-end market value of common equity
Total Assets
Total Liabilities
Income before extraordinary items
Total assets before pension assets
Total liabilities before pension liabilities
Earnings before extraordinary items before pension costs
Total pension assets
Total pension costs
Market value of firm’s pension debt
Pension assets invested in equities
Pension assets invested in bonds
Pension assets invested in real estate
Pension assets not invested in equities, bonds, or real estate
Pension interest costs
Pension service costs
Actual return on plan assets
Deferred return on plan assets
amortization of the transition asset
Sales divided by total assets
Number of firm years
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2010-11
Mean
Std.
dev.
37.73 76.76
49.55 92.48
30.83 39.67
2.28
9.95
42.91 87.36
28.72 36.46
2.53 10.33
664.03 1254
1.30
2.67
2.11
4.46
258.11 476.3
345.23 817.0
11.77 43.98
48.91 146.2
0.43
0.73
0.14
0.32
0.56
1.60
6.25 12.86
-6.09 12.68
1.02
0.69
1561

Table
T
2 Perceentages of Classes of Pen
nsion Assetssb
Variable
V
Bonds
Equity
RealEstate
R
OtherAssets
O
N
b

Equity
E
Bonds
B
RealEstate
R
OtherAssets
O
N

2003-2006
Mean
M
Std.
dev.
31.19
3
14.11
62.92
6
14.68
1.28
3.28
4.60
10.67
3191
3

2007
Mean Std
d.
dev
v.
32.50
15
5.44
60.44
15
5.85
1.50
3.64
3
5.57
12
2.58
883

20008
Mean Std.
dev.
37.99
16.40
53.06
16.28
3.97
1.73
5.22
14.64
854

2009
Meaan Std.
dev.
37.997
16.24
53.664
17.44
1.36
3.19
14.03
7.002
8227

2010-11
M
Mean Std.
dev.
338.83
16.399
552.71
17.455
1.38
3.122
7.09
13.800
1561

Percentage of
o plan assets in
nvested in equuities
Percentage of
o plan assets in
nvested in bonnds
Percentage of
o plan assets in
nvested in reall estate
Percentage of
o plan assets not
n invested in equities, bondds, or real estatee
Number of firm
f
years

Figure 1
Percentages of
o Classes off Pension Asssets
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Table 3 Estimation of market value for 2003-2011, variables in per-share form
(N=7316)c
MVEit = β0 + β1 TAit + β2 TLit + β3 Earningsit + β4 AssetTurnit + β5 FinCrisisit +β6 Fin_TAit + ε

(7)

MVEit = β0 + β1 AbPAit + β2 TLbPLit + β3 EbPCit + β4 PenAssetsit + β5 PCosts + β6 PLiabit
+ β7 AssetTurnit + β8 FinCrisisit + β9 Fin_AbPAit + β10 Fin_PenAssetsit + ε

(8)

MVEit = β0 + β1 AbPAit + β2 TLbPLit + β3 EbPCi+ β4 Equityit + β5 Bondsit + β6 Real Estateit
+ β7 Other Assetsit + β8 PLiabit + β9 SVCit+ β10 INTit + β11 DEFRETit + β12 RPLNAit
+ β13 ATRANSit + β14 AssetTurnit + β15 FinCrisisit + β16 Fin_AbPAit + β17 Fin_Bondsit
+ β18 Fin_Equityit + β19 Fin_RealEstateit + β20 Fin_OtherAssetsit + ε

(9)

Variables
TA
TL
Earnings
AbPA
TLbPL
EbPC
PAssets
PCosts
PLiab
Bonds
RealEstate
Equity
OtherAssets
INT
SVC
RPLNA
DEFRET
ATRANS
AssetTurn
FinCrisis
Fin_TA
Fin_AbPA
Fin_PA
Fin_Bonds
Fin_Equity
Fin_RealEstate
Fin_OtherAssets
Overall R2

Model (7)
0.688***
-0.610***
1.142***

Model (8)

0.671***
-0.625***
1.184***
0.011***
0.156**
-0.725***

2.342***
-0.321
-0.154***

1.866**
-0.215***
-0.150***
-0.001***

0.8780

0.8830

*, **, *** Significance at .10, .05, .01.
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Model (9)

0.697***
-0.587***
1.151***
-0.364***
0.022***
0.078***
0.018***
0.031***
-25.040***
-2.117
0.491***
-0.853
-1.018
3.101***
-1.125**
-0.149***
0.005**
0.004***
-0.014
-0.005
0.8701

Table 3 (cont.)
c

MVE
TA
TL
Earnings
AbPA
TLbPL
EbPC
PAssets
PCosts
PLiab
Equity
Bonds
RealEstate
OtherAssets
INT
SVC
RPLNA
DEFRET
ATRANS
AssetTurn
FinCrisis
Fin_TA
Fin_AbPA
Fin_PA
Fin_Equity
Fin_Bonds
Fin_RealEstate
Fin_OtherAssets
N

Fiscal year-end market value of common equity
Total Assets
Total Liabilities
Income before extraordinary items
Total assets before pension assets
Total liabilities before pension liabilities
Earnings before extraordinary items before pension costs
Total pension assets
Total pension costs
Market value of firm’s pension debt
Pension assets invested in equities
Pension assets invested in bonds
Pension assets invested in real estate
Pension assets not invested in equities, bonds, or real estate
Pension interest costs
Pension service costs
Actual return on plan assets
Deferred return on plan assets
Amortization of the transition asset
Sales divided by total assets
If year = 2008-09, 1; 0 otherwise
Interaction between FinCrisis and Total assets
Interaction between FinCrisis and Total assets before pension assets
Interaction between FinCrisis and plan assets
Interaction between FinCrisis and plan assets invested in equities
Interaction between FinCrisis and plan bonds invested in bonds
Interaction between FinCrisis and plan assets invested in real estate
Interaction between FinCrisis and plan assets not invested in equities, bonds, or
real estate
Number of firm years
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Table 4 Estimation of market value for 2003-2011, variables in per-share form (N=7316)d to
determine effect of various Financial Crisis periods on Asset classifications
MVEit = β0 + β1 AbPAit + β2 TLbPLit + β3 EbPCi+ β4 Equityit + β5 Bondsit + β6 Real Estateit
+ β7 Other Assetsit + β8 SVCit+ β9 INTit + β10 DEFRETit + β11 RPLNAit + β12 ATRANSit
+ β13 PLiabit + β14 AssetTurnit + β15 FinCrisisit + β16 Fin_Equityit + β17 Fin_Bondsit
(9)
+ β18 Fin_RealEstateit + β19 Fin_OtherAssetsit + β20 Fin_AbPA + ε
MVEit = β0 + β1 AbPAit + β2 TLbPLit + β3 EbPCi+ β4 Equityit + β5 Bondsit + β6 Real Estateit
+ β7 Other Assetsit + β8 SVCit+ β9 INTit + β10 DEFRETit + β11 RPLNAit + β12 ATRANSit
+ β13 PLiabit + β14 AssetTurnit + β15 FinCrisis2it + β16 Fin2_Equityit + β17 Fin2_Bondsit
+ β18 Fin2_RealEstateit + β19 Fin2_OtherAssetsit + β20 Fin2_AbPA + ε
(10)
MVEit = β0 + β1 AbPAit + β2 TLbPLit + β3 EbPCi+ β4 Equityit + β5 Bondsit + β6 Real Estateit
+ β7 Other Assetsit + β8 SVCit+ β9 INTit + β10 DEFRETit + β11 RPLNAit + β12 ATRANSit
+ β13 PLiabit + β14 AssetTurnit + β15 FinCrisis2it + β16 Fin2_Equityit + β17 Fin2_Bondsit
+ β18 Fin_RealEstateit + β19 Fin2_OtherAssetsit + + β20 Fin2_AbPA +ε
(11)

Variables
AbPA
TLbPL
EbPC
PLiab
Bonds
RealEstate
Equity
OtherAssets
INT
SVC
RPLNA
DEFRET
ATRANS
AssetTurn
FinCrisis
AbPA_Fin
AbPA_Fin2
Fin_Bonds
Fin_Equity
Fin_RealEstate
Fin_Other Assets
FinCrisis2
Fin2_Bonds
Fin2_Equity
Fin2_RealEstate
Fin2_Other Assets
Overall R2

Model (9)
0.697***
-0.587***
1.151***
-0.364***
0.022***
0.078***
0.018***
0.031***
-25.040***
-2.117
0.491***
-0.853
-1.018
3.101***
-1.125**
-0.149***

Model (10)
0.663***
-0.549***
1.337***
-0.236***
0.022***
0.082***
0.019***
0.033***
-29.304***
-2.480
0.820***
0.684
0.505
2.800***

Model (11)
0.701***
-0.592***
1.125***
-0.355***
0.022***
0.073***
0.017***
0.031***
-24.578***
-1.543
-0.521***
-0.662
-0.823
3.066***

-0.109***

-0.157***
0.004*
0.003*

0.005**
0.004***
-0.014
-0.005
0.223
0.005**
0.005***
-0.015
-0.002
0.8701

0.8671

*, **, *** Significance at .10, .05, .01.
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-0.008*
0.912***
0.005
0.8705

Table 4 (cont.)
d

MVE
AbPA
TLbPL
EbPC
PAssets
PCosts
PLiab
Equity
Bonds
RealEstate
OtherAssets
INT
SVC
RPLNA
DEFRET
ATRANS
AssetTurn
FinCrisis
Fin_AbPA
FinCrisis_Equity
FinCrisis_Bonds
FinCrisis_RealEstate
FinCrisis_OtherAssets

Fiscal year-end market value of common equity
Total assets before pension assets
Total liabilities before pension liabilities
Earnings before extraordinary items before pension costs
Total pension assets
Total pension costs
Market value of firm’s pension debt
Pension assets invested in equities
Pension assets invested in bonds
Pension assets invested in real estate
Pension assets not invested in equities, bonds, or real estate
Pension interest costs
Pension service costs
Actual return on plan assets
Deferred return on plan assets
amortization of the transition asset
Sales divided by total assets
if year = 2008-09, 1; 0 otherwise
Interaction between FinCrisis and total assets before plan assets
Interaction between FinCrisis and plan assets invested in equities
Interaction between FinCrisis and plan bonds invested in bonds
Interaction between FinCrisis and plan assets invested in real estate
Interaction between FinCrisis and plan assets not invested in equities, bonds, or
real estate
FinCrisis2
1 for years 2007-2009; 0 otherwise
Fin2_AbPA
Interaction between FinCrisis2 and total assets before plan assets
FinCrisis2_Equity
Interaction between FinCrisis2 and plan assets invested in equities
FinCrisis2_Bonds
Interaction between FinCrisis2 and plan bonds invested in bonds
FinCrisis2_RealEstate
Interaction between FinCrisis2 and plan assets invested in real estate
FinCrisis2_OtherAssets Interaction between FinCrisis2 and plan assets not invested in equities, bonds, or
real estate
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Table 5 Estimation of market value for 2003-2011, variables in per-share form
(N=6093)e to determine effect of various Financial Crisis periods on Asset classifications;
Firms with positive earnings only
MVEit = β0 + β1 AbPAit + β2 TLbPLit + β3 EbPCi+ β4 Equityit + β5 Bondsit + β6 Real Estateit
+ β7 Other Assetsit + β8 SVCit+ β9 INTit + β10 DEFRETit + β11 RPLNAit + β12 ATRANSit
+ β13 PLiabit + β14 AssetTurnit + β15 FinCrisisit + β16 FinCrisis_Equityit + β17 FinCrisis_Bondsit
+ β18 FinCrisis_RealEstateit + β19 FinCrisis_OtherAssetsit + β20 Fin_AbPA + ε
(9)

Variables
AbPA
TLbPL
EbPC
PLiab
Bonds
RealEstate
Equity
OtherAssets
INT
SVC
RPLNA
DEFRET
ATRANS
AssetTurn
FinCrisis
Fin_AbPA
Fin_Bonds
Fin_Equity
Fin_RealEstate
Fin_Other Assets
Overall R2

Model (9) with
positive earnings
0.591***
-0.485***
3.041***
-0.137**
0.028***
0.062***
0.029***
0.036***
-46.572***
-5.135**
0.282
1.277
1.285
0.126
-5.727***
-0.037***
0.009***
0.004*
0.012
0.002
0.9125

*, **, *** Significance at .10, .05, .01.
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Table 5(cont.)
e

MVE
AbPA
TLbPL
EbPC
PAssets
PCosts
PLiab
Equity
Bonds
RealEstate
OtherAssets
INT
SVC
RPLNA
DEFRET
ATRANS
AssetTurn
FinCrisis
Fin_AbPA
Fin_Bonds
Fin_Equity
Fin_RealEstate
Fin_OtherAssets

Fiscal year-end market value of common equity
Total assets before pension assets
Total liabilities before pension liabilities
Earnings before extraordinary items before pension costs
Total pension assets
Total pension costs
Market value of firm’s pension debt
Pension assets invested in equities
Pension assets invested in bonds
Pension assets invested in real estate
Pension assets not invested in equities, bonds, or real estate
Pension interest costs
Pension service costs
Actual return on plan assets
Deferred return on plan assets
amortization of the transition asset
Sales divided by total assets
if year = 2008-09, 1; 0 otherwise
Interaction between FinCrisis and Total assets before pension assets
Interaction between FinCrisis and plan bonds invested in bonds
Interaction between FinCrisis and plan assets invested in equities
Interaction between FinCrisis and plan assets invested in real estate
Interaction between FinCrisis and plan assets not invested in equities, bonds, or
real estate
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Table 6 Estimation of market value for 2003-2011, variables in per-share form to determine the effect of SFAS 158 (N = 2272 for
2003-2005 and N = 5044 for 2006-2011)f
MVEit = β0 + β1 AbPAit + β2 TLbPLit + β3 EbPCi+ β4 Equityit + β5 Bondsit + β6 Real Estateit + β7 Other Assetsit + β8 PLiabit + β9 SVCit+ β10 INTit
+ β11 DEFRETit + β12 RPLNAit + β13 ATRANSit + β14 AssetTurnit + β15 FinCrisisit + β16 Fin_AbPAit + β17 Fin_Bondsit + β18 Fin_Equityit
+ β19 Fin_RealEstateit + β20 Fin_OtherAssetsit + ε
Variable16
AbPA
Pre SFAS 158 1.419***
2003-05
Post SFAS 158 0.471***
2006-2011
Difference
-0.948
F (1, 6094)
44.03
Prob>F
0.000
Overall R2 = 0.8187
Variable
DEFRET
Pre SFAS 158 2.281
2003-05
Post SFAS 158 -1.477*
2006-2011
Difference17
-3.758
F (1, 6094)
0.02
Prob>F
0.521
Overall R2 = .8558

(9)

TLpPL
-1.298***

EbPC
0.723***

Bonds
-0.001

Equity
0.026***

RealEstate
0.031*

OtherAssets
0.015**

PLiab
0.031

INT
-15.810***

SVC
9.386*

RPLNA
-1.672**

-0.149***

1.167***

0.016***

0.011***

0.061***

0.027***

-0.945***

-21.235***

-5.568*

0.040**

1.149
71.92
0.000

0.444
47.60
0.000

0.017
19.25
0.000

-0.015
12.48
0.000

0.030
4.81
0.0004

0.012
0.29
0.590

-0.976
5.47
0.019

-5.425
11.28
0.0008

-14.954
0.08
0.774

1.712
2.19
0.139

ATRANS
3.342*

AssetTurn
7.010***

FinCrisis

Fin_AbPA

Fin_Bonds

Fin_Equity

Fin_RealEstate

Fin_OtherAssets

-1.582*

2.846***

-0.992*

0.003

0.003

0.005***

-0.18

-0.003

-4.924
0.41
0.521

-4.164
2.21
0.0132

9.08
0.003

538.0
0.000

0.74
0.391

8.83
0.003

1.55
0.214

-

1.12
0.290

16

*, **, *** Significance at 0.10, 0.05, 0.01

17

For the variables FinCrisis, Fin_AbPA, Fin_Bonds, Fin_Equity, Fin_RealEstate, and Fin_Other Assets, I am testing if these coefficients are equal to zero.
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Table 6 (cont.)
H0: β0 = β1 = ……= β20 = 0 H0: AbPA1 = AbPA2 & TLbPL2 = TLbPL1…..& AssetTurn2 = AssetTurn1& Fin2Crisis= 0 &….Fin2_OtherAssets = 018
F(34, 6094) = 253.98
F(20, 6094) = 56.48
Prob>F = 0.000
Prob>F = 0.000
f

MVE
AbPA
TLbPL
EbPC
PLiab
Equity
Bonds
RealEstate
OtherAssets
INT
SVC
RPLNA
DEFRET
ATRANS
AssetTurn
FinCrisis
Fin_TA
Fin_AbPA
Fin_PA
Fin_Equity
Fin_Bonds
Fin_RealEstate
Fin_OtherAssets
N

Fiscal year-end market value of common equity
Total assets before pension assets
Total liabilities before pension liabilities
Earnings before extraordinary items before pension costs
Market value of firm’s pension debt
Pension assets invested in equities
Pension assets invested in bonds
Pension assets invested in real estate
Pension assets not invested in equities, bonds, or real estate
Pension interest costs
Pension service costs
Actual return on plan assets
Deferred return on plan assets
Amortization of the transition asset
Sales divided by total assets
If year = 2008-09, 1; 0 otherwise
Interaction between FinCrisis and Total assets
Interaction between FinCrisis and Total assets before pension assets
Interaction between FinCrisis and plan assets
Interaction between FinCrisis and plan assets invested in equities
Interaction between FinCrisis and plan bonds invested in bonds
Interaction between FinCrisis and plan assets invested in real estate
Interaction between FinCrisis and plan assets not invested in equities, bonds, or
real estate
Number of firm years

18

AbPA1 is the coefficient for AbPA in pre-SFAS 158 period, AbPA2 is the coefficient for AbPA in post-SFAS 158 period, etc. and Fin2Crisis is the
coefficient for FinCrisis in the post –SFAS 158 period, etc.
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Table 7 Descriptive statistics (scaled by total assets); 2004-2011a
N=6056
Variable
MVEt
MVEt-1
NPE t-1
EbPC t-1
PA t-1
Bonds t-1
Equity t-1
RealEstate t-1
OtherAssets t-1
PLiab t-1
PC t-1
SVC t-1
INT t-1
a

Mean
1.115
1.039
0.488
0.046
14.506
4.695
8.755
0.250
0.806
0.066
0.026
0.004
0.010

St. dev.
0.996
0.864
0.267
0.090
15.357
5.706
9.627
0.845
2.641
0.098
0.026
0.004
0.010

Variable
DEFRET t-1
RPLNA t-1
ATRANS t-1
ACC
ChAR t-1
ChINV t-1
ChAP t-1
DEPAMOR t-1
OtherACC t-1
AssetTurn t-1

Mean
0.143
0.010
-0.140
0.041
0.006
0.005
0.004
0.042
0.076
0.059

DA t-1
NDA t-1

-6.76 e-06
-0.0002

MVE
NPE
EbPC
PA
Equity
Bonds
RealEstate
OtherAssets
PLiab
PC
SVC
INT
DEFRET
RPLNA
ATRANS
ACC

St. dev.
0.190
0.028
0.188
0.092
0.048
0.035
0.033
0.023
0.978
0.221
0.0004
0.003

Fiscal year-end market value of common equity at time t or t-1
Owner’s equity plus net pension liabilities
Earnings before extraordinary items before pension costs
Pension assets: Equity + Bonds + RealEstate + OtherAssets
Pension assets invested in equities
Pension assets invested in bonds
Pension assets invested in real estate
Pension assets not invested in equities, bonds, or real estate
Market value of firm’s pension debt
Pension costs: SVC + INT + DEFRET + RPLNA + ATRANS
Pension service costs
Pension interest costs
Deferred return on plan assets
Actual return on plan assets
Amortization of the transition asset
Accruals: NI before extraordinary items less operating cash flows before
extraordinary items and deprivation/amortization.
ChAR
Change in accounts receivable
ChINV
Change in inventories
ChAP
Change in accounts payable
DEPAMOR Depreciation and amortization expense
OtherACC Other accruals: ACC – (ChAR + ChINV – ChAP +DEPAMOR)
AssetTurn
Sales divided by total asset
NDA
Non-discretionary accruals using the Modified Jones model
DA
Discretionary accruals calculated using the Modified Jones model
N
Number of firm years
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Table 8
Mean Percentage of plan assets invested in various classes of Assets (2004-2011)b
Year
Variable
2004
Bonds
N = 502 Equity
RealEstate
Other Assets
2005
Bonds
N = 769 Equity
RealEstate
Other Assets
2006
Bonds
N = 848 Equity
RealEstate
Other Assets
2007
Bonds
N = 819 Equity
RealEstate
Other Assets
b

Bonds
Equity
RealEstate
Other Assets

Mean
30.855
63.695
1.112
4.338
31.149
63.459
1.107
4.285
31.116
62.958
1.341
4.585
31.399
62.167
1.443
4.991

St.Dev.
13.128
14.136
2.666
11.255
13.456
14.272
3.193
10.319
14.147
14.518
3.456
10.307
14.896
15.348
3.582
11.323

Year
Variable
2008
Bonds
N = 817 Equity
RealEstate
Other Assets
2009
Bonds
N = 797 Equity
RealEstate
Other Assets
2010
Bonds
N = 773 Equity
RealEstate
Other Assets
2011
Bonds
N = 731 Equity
RealEstate
Other Assets

Mean
32.106
60.684
1.505
5.706
38.091
53.018
1.698
7.194
37.929
53.676
1.370
7.025
37.492
54.389
1.288
6.831

St.Dev.
14.824
15.225
3.687
12.855
16.495
16.361
3.919
14.811
15.957
17.224
3.218
14.123
16.013
16.954
3.075
13.870

Percentage of pension assets invested in bonds
Percentage of pension assets invested in equities
Percentage of pension assets invested in real estate
Percentage of pension assets not invested in bonds, equities and real estate
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Figure 2 Meaan Percentage of plan asssets investedd in various classes of Assets (20032010)
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Table 9
Estimation of market value for 2003-2011, scaled by total assets (N=6056)c
MVEt = β0 + β1 NPEt -1 + β2 EbPCt -1 + β3 PAt -1 + β4 PCt -1 + β5 PLiabt -1 + β6 ACCt -1 + β7 AssetTurnt – 1
+ β8 FinCrisist – 1 + β11 Fin_PAt – 1 + β12 Fin_PCt – 1 + β13 Fin_ACCt -1 + ε
(12)
MVEt = β0 + β1 NPEt -1 + β2 EbPCt -1 + β3 Bondst -1 + β4 Equityt -1 + β5 RealEstatet -1 + β6 OtherAssetst -1
+ β7 SVCt -1 + β8 INTt -1 + β9 DEFRETt -1 + β10 RPLNAt -1 + β11 ATRANSt -1 + β12 PLiab t – 1
+ β13 ChARt -1 + β14 ChINVt -1 + β15 ChAPt -1 + β16 DEPAMORt -1 + β17 OtherACCt -1
+ β18 AssetTurnt – 1 + β19 FinCrisist – 1 + β20 Fin_Bondst -1 + β21 Fin_Equityt -1
+ β22 Fin_RealEstatet -1 + β23 Fin_OtherAssetst -1 + β24 Fin_SVCt -1 + β25 Fin_ INTt -1
+ β26Fin_ DEFRETt -1 + β27 Fin_RPLNAt -1 + β28Fin_ ATRANSt -1 + β29 Fin_ChARt – 1
+ β30 Fin_ChINVt – 1 + β31 Fin_ChAPt – 1 + β32 Fin_DEPAMORt – 1 + β33 Fin_OtherACCt – 1 + ε
(13)

Variable
NPE t-1
EbPC t-1
PA t-1
Bonds t-1
Equity t-1
RealEstate t-1
OtherAssets t-1
PLiab t-1
PC t-1
SVC t-1
INT t-1
DEFRET t-1
RPLNA t-1
ATRANS t-1
ACC
ChAR t-1
ChINV t-1
ChAP t-1
DEPAMOR t-1
OtherACC t-1
AssetTurn t-1
FinCrisis
Fin_PA
Fin_Bonds
Fin_Equity
Fin_RealEstate
Fin_OtherAssets
Fin_PC
Fin_SVC

Model 12
0.641***
1.598***
0.004

Model 13
0.760***
1.521***
-0.002
0.008*
0.027
0.005
-0.562***

-0.149
0.727

14.040***
2.197
2.501
0.361
2.614
0.843**
2.743***
0.457
-1.911***
2.197**
0.854**
0.187***
-0.248***

0.266***
-0.188***
0.006***

-0.006
-0.019***
-0.006*
-0.009
-1.168
-8.610*
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Table 9 (cont.)
Variable
Fin_INT
Fin_DEFRET
Fin_RPLNA
Fin_ATRANS
Fin_ACC
Fin_ChAR
Fin_ChINV
Fin_ChAP
Fin_DEPAMOR
Fin_Oth
Adjusted R2
c

Model 12

Model 13
32.547***
-3.198
-0.013
-3.204

-2.843***
-5.558***
-5.558***
4.701***
3.348***
2.401***
0.2032

0.1745

MVE
Fiscal year-end market value of common equity at time t or t-1
NPE
Owner’s equity plus net pension liabilities
EbPC
Earnings before extraordinary items before pension costs
PA
Pension assets: Equity + Bonds + RealEstate + OtherAssets
Equity
Pension assets invested in equities
Bonds
Pension assets invested in bonds
RealEstate
Pension assets invested in real estate
OtherAssets
Pension assets not invested in equities, bonds, or real estate
PLiab
Market value of firm’s pension debt
PC
Pension costs: SVC + INT + DEFRET + RPLNA + ATRANS
SVC
Pension service costs
INT
Pension interest costs
DEFRET
Deferred return on plan assets
RPLNA Actual return on plan assets
ATRANS
Amortization of the transition asset
ACC
Accruals: NI before extraordinary items less operating cash flows before
extraordinary items and deprivation/amortization.
ChAR
Change in accounts receivable
ChINV
Change in inventories
ChAP
Change in accounts payable
DEPAMOR
Depreciation and amortization expense
OtherACC
Other accruals: ACC – (ChAR + ChINV – ChAP +DEPAMOR)
AssetTurn
Sales divided by total asset
FinCrisis
1 for years 2007, 2008, 2009, 0 otherwise
Fin_PA
Interaction between FinCrisis and PA
Fin_Bonds
Interaction between FinCrisis and Bonds
Fin_Equity
Interaction between FinCrisis and Equity
Fin_RealEstate Interaction between FinCrisis and RealEstate
Fin_OtherAssets Interaction between FinCrisis and OtherAssets
Fin_PLiab
Interaction between FinCrisis and PLiab
Fin_PC
Interaction between FinCrisis and PC
Fin_SVC
Interaction between FinCrisis and SVC
Fin_INT
Interaction between FinCrisis and INT
Fin_DEFRET Interaction between FinCrisis and DEFRET
Fin_RPLNA
Interaction between FinCrisis and RPLNA
Fin_ATRANS Interaction between FinCrisis and ATRANS
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Table 9 (cont.)
Fin_ACC
Interaction between FinCrisis and ACC
Fin_ChAR
Interaction between FinCrisis and ChAR
Fin_ChINV
Interaction between FinCrisis and ChINV
Fin_ChAP
Interaction between FinCrisis and ChAP
Fin_DEPAMOR Interaction between FinCrisis and DEPAMOR
Fin_OtherACC Interaction between FinCrisis and OtherACC
Fin_AssetTurn Interaction between FinCrisis and AssetTurn
N
Number of firm years
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Table 10
Estimation of market value for 2003-2011, scaled by Total Assets to determine the effect of SFAS 158 (N = 1271 for 2004-2005
and N = 3937 for 2007-2011)d
MVEt = β0 + β1 NPEt -1 + β2 EbPCt -1 + β3 Bondst -1 + β4 Equityt -1 + β5 RealEstatet -1 + β6 OtherAssetst -1 + β7 SVCt -1 + β8 INTt -1 + β9 DEFRETt -1
+ β10 RPLNAt -1 + β11 ATRANSt -1 + β12 PLiab t – 1 + β13 ChARt -1 + β14 ChINVt -1 + β15 ChAPt -1 + β16 DEPAMORt -1 + β17 OtherACCt -1
+ β18 AssetTurnt – 1 + β19 FinCrisist – 1 + β20 Fin_Bondst -1 + β21 Fin_Equityt -1 + β22 Fin_RealEstatet -1 + β23 Fin_OtherAssetst -1 + β24 Fin_SVCt -1
+ β25 Fin_ INTt -1 + β26Fin_ DEFRETt -1 + β27 Fin_RPLNAt -1 + β28Fin_ ATRANSt -1 + β29 Fin_ChARt – 1 + β30 Fin_ChINVt – 1
+ β31 Fin_ChAPt – 1 + β32 Fin_DEPAMORt – 1 + β33 Fin_OtherACCt – 1 + ε
(13)
Variable19
Pre SFAS 158
2004-05
Post SFAS 158
2007-2011
Difference
F (1, 4072)
Prob>F

Variable
Pre SFAS 158
2004-05
Post SFAS 158
2007-2011
Difference20
F (1, 4072)
Prob>F

NPE
0.924***

EbPC
3.427***

Bonds
0.010

Equity
0.014

RealEstate
0.049*

OtherAssets
0.015

SVC
9.318

INT
-2.699

RPLNA
3.353

DEFRET
4.239

ATRANS
6.245*

0.758***

0.782*

-0.001

0.012*

0.016

0.006

18.496***

5.812

-4.116

-1.008

-1.111

-0.166
3.40
0.065

-2.645
7.91
0.005

-0.011
0.75
0.386

-0.002
0.04
0.834

-0.033
1.28
0.258

-0.009
0.51
0.475

9.178
1.41
0.236

8.511
0.60
.439

-7.469
5.06
0.025

-5.247
0.79
0.375

-7.356
1.52
0.218

PLiab
-0.383

ChAR
1.778*

ChINV
-1.312

ChAP
0.056

DEPAMOR
3.055**

OtherACC
0.024

AssetTurn
-0.025

FinCrisis

Fin_Bonds

Fin_Equity

0.316

3.663***

1.564**

-3.388***

2.185*

0.894**

0.352***

-0.179***

-0.007

-0.022***

0.699
0.84
0.360

1.885
2.34
0.127

2.876
5.55
0.019

-3.444
5.50
0.019

-0.870
0.40
0.527

0.870
0.92
0.338

0.377
15.84
0.000

17.07
0.000

0.77
0.381

11.18
0.001

19

*, **, *** Significance at 0.10, 0.05, 0.01

20

For the variables FinCrisis, Fin_XXX, I am testing if these coefficients are equal to zero.
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Table 10 (cont.)
Variable
Post SFAS 158
2007-2011
F (1, 4911)21
Prob>F
Variable
Post SFAS 158
2007-2011
F (1, 4911) 22
Prob>F

Fin_RealEstate
-0.036

Fin_OtherAssets
-0.001

Fin_SVC
-6.997

Fin_INT
22.676***

Fin_DEFRET
0.593

Fin_RPLNA
4.627***

Fin_ATRANS
0.786

Fin_ChAR
-5.799***

Fin_ChINV
-3.683***

2.238
0.123

0.88
0.349

1.38
0.240

10.20
0.001

0.01
0.909

2.91
0.088

0.02
0.880

66.19
0.000

28.98
0.000

Fin_ChAP
5.512***

Fin_DEPAMOR
2.938***

Fin_OtherACC
-1.744***

35.36
0.000

13.43
0.000

52.18
0.000

Adjusted R2
Pre-SFAS 158: 0.0672
Post-SFAS 158: .2252
H0: β0 = β1 = ……= β 33 = 0
F (52, 4077) = 21.72
Prob > F
= 0.0000
H0: NPE1 = NPE2 & EbPC2 = EbPC1…..& AssetTurn2 = AssetTurn1& Fin2Crisis= 0 &….Fin2_OtherAssets = 023
F (33, 4077) = 18.64
Prob>F = 0.000

21

For the variables Fin_XXX, I am testing if these coefficients are equal to zero.

22

For the variables Fin_XXX, I am testing if these coefficients are equal to zero.

23

NPE1 is the coefficient for NPE in pre-SFAS 158 period, NPE2 is the coefficient for NPE in post-SFAS 158 period, etc. and Fin2Crisis is the coefficient
for FinCrisis in the post–SFAS 158 period, etc.
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Table 10 (cont.)
c

MVE
NPE
EbPC
Bonds
Equity
Table 10 (cont.)
RealEstate
OtherAssets
PLiab
SVC
INT
DEFRET
RPLNA
ATRANS
ChAR
ChINV
ChAP
DEPAMOR
OtherACC
AssetTurn

Fiscal year-end market value of common equity at time t or t-1
Owner’s equity plus net pension liabilities
Earnings before extraordinary items before pension costs
Pension assets invested in bonds
Pension assets invested in equities

FinCrisis
Fin_Bonds
Fin_Equity
Fin_RealEstate
Fin_OtherAssets

1 for years 2007, 2008, 2009, 0 otherwise
Interaction between FinCrisis and Bonds
Interaction between FinCrisis and Equity
Interaction between FinCrisis and RealEstate
Interaction between FinCrisis and OtherAssets

Pension assets invested in real estate
Pension assets not invested in equities, bonds, or real estate
Market value of firm’s pension debt
Pension service costs
Pension interest costs
Deferred return on plan assets
Actual return on plan assets
Amortization of the transition asset
Change in accounts receivable
Change in inventories
Change in accounts payable
Depreciation and amortization expense
Other accruals: ACC – (ChAR + ChINV – ChAP +DEPAMOR)
Sales divided by total asset

Fin_PLiab
Fin_SVC
Fin_INT
Fin_DEFRET
Fin_RPLNA
Fin_ATRANS
Fin_ChAR
Fin_ChINV
Fin_ChAP
Fin_DEPAMOR
Fin_OtherACC
Fin_AssetTurn
N

Interaction between FinCrisis and PLiab
Interaction between FinCrisis and SVC
Interaction between FinCrisis and INT
Interaction between FinCrisis and DEFRET
Interaction between FinCrisis and RPLNA
Interaction between FinCrisis and ATRANS
Interaction between FinCrisis and ChAR
Interaction between FinCrisis and ChINV
Interaction between FinCrisis and ChAP
Interaction between FinCrisis and DEPAMOR
Interaction between FinCrisis and OtherACC
Interaction between FinCrisis and AssetTurn
Number of firm years
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Table 11
Estimation of market value for 2003-2011, scaled by total assets (N=6056)e
MVEt = β0 + β1 NPE t -1 + β2 EbPC t -1 + β3 PA t -1 + β4 PC t -1 + β5 PLiab t – 1 + β6 DA t -1 + β7 NDA t -1
+ β8 AssetTurnt – 1 + β9 FinCrisis t – 1 + β10 Fin_PA t - 1 + β11 Fin_PCt – 1 + β12 Fin_DA t – 1
+ β13 Fin_NDA t – 1 + ε
(14)
MVEt = β0 + β1 NPE t -1 + β2 EbPC t -1 + β2 Bonds t -1 + β3 Equity t -1 + β4 Real Estate t -1
+ β5 Other Assets t -1 + β6 SVC t -1 + β7 INT t -1 + β8 DEFRET t -1 + β9 RPLNA t -1 + β10 ATRANS t -1
+ β11 PLiab t – 1 + β12 DA t -1 + β13 NDA t -1 + β14 AssetTurnt – 1 + β15 FinCrisis t – 1 + β16 Fin_Bonds t -1
+ β17 Fin_Equity t – 1 + β18 Fin_RealEstate t – 1 + β19 Fin_OtherAssetst – 1 + β20 Fin_SVC t -1
+ β21 Fin_ INTt -1 + β22Fin_ DEFRETt-1 + β23 Fin_RPLNA t -1 + β24Fin_ ATRANS t -1
+ β25 Fin_DA t – 1 + β26 Fin_NDA t – 1 + ε
(15)

Variables
NPE
EbPC
PA
Bonds
Equity
RealEstate
OtherAssets
PC
SVC
INT
DEFRET
RPLNA
ATRANS
PLiab
DA
NDA
AssetTurn
FinCrisis
Fin_PA
Fin_Bonds
Fin_Equity
Fin_RealEstate
Fin_OtherAssets
Fin_PC
Fin_SVC
Fin_INT
Fin_DEFRET
Fin_RPLNA
Fin_ATRANS
Fin_DA
Fin_NDA
Overall R2

Model (3)

Model (4)

0.675***
0.510***
0.007***

0.812***
0.508***
-0.002
0.012**
0.025
0.006

0.252
16.371***
6.243
1.908
-0.216
2.059
-0.759***
36.188*
0.001
0.189***
-0.314***

-0.283**
35.393
0.006
0.284***
-0.308***
0.005**

-0.008
-0.028***
-0.040**
-0.015*
-1.028
-15.189***
40.752***
-1.777
0.573
-1.806
87.941*
-1.472***
0.1648

79.692*
-1.718***
0.1432
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Table 11 (cont.)
e

MVE
Fiscal year-end market value of common equity at time t or t-1
NPE
Owner’s equity plus net pension liabilities
EbPC
Earnings before extraordinary items before pension costs
PA
Pension assets: Equity + Bonds + RealEstate + OtherAssets
Equity
Pension assets invested in equities
Bonds
Pension assets invested in bonds
RealEstate
Pension assets invested in real estate
OtherAssets
Pension assets not invested in equities, bonds, or real estate
PLiab
Market value of firm’s pension debt
PC
Pension costs: SVC + INT + DEFRET + RPLNA + ATRANS
SVC
Pension service costs
INT
Pension interest costs
DEFRET
Deferred return on plan assets
RPLNA Actual return on plan assets
ATRANS
Amortization of the transition asset
NDA
Non-discretionary accruals using the Modified Jones model
DA
Discretionary accruals calculated using the Modified Jones model
AssetTurn
Sales divided by total asset
FinCrisis
1 for years 2007, 2008, 2009, 0 otherwise
Fin_PA
Interaction between FinCrisis and PA
Fin_Bonds
Interaction between FinCrisis and Bonds
Fin_Equity
Interaction between FinCrisis and Equity
Fin_RealEstate Interaction between FinCrisis and RealEstate
Fin_OtherAssets Interaction between FinCrisis and OtherAssets
Fin_PLiab
Interaction between FinCrisis and PLiab
Fin_PC
Interaction between FinCrisis and PC
Fin_SVC
Interaction between FinCrisis and SVC
Fin_INT
Interaction between FinCrisis and INT
Fin_DEFRET Interaction between FinCrisis and DEFRET
Fin_RPLNA
Interaction between FinCrisis and RPLNA
Fin_ATRANS Interaction between FinCrisis and ATRANS
Fin_DA
Interaction between FinCrisis and DA
Fin_NDA
Interaction between FinCrisis and NDA
Fin_AssetTurn Interaction between FinCrisis and AssetTurn
N
Number of firm years
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Table 12
Estimation of market value for 2003-2011, scaled by Total Assets to determine the effect of SFAS 158 (N = 1271 for 2004-2005
and N = 3937 for 2007-2011)f
MVEt = β0 + β1 NPE t -1 + β2 EbPC t -1 + β2 Bonds t -1 + β3 Equity t -1 + β4 Real Estate t -1 + β5 Other Assets t -1 + β6 SVC t -1 + β7 INT t -1 + β8 DEFRET t -1
+ β9 RPLNA t -1 + β10 ATRANS t -1 + β11 PLiab t – 1 + β12 DA t -1 + β13 NDA t -1 + β14 AssetTurnt – 1 + β15 FinCrisis t – 1 + β16 Fin_Bonds t -1
+ β17 Fin_Equity t – 1 + β18 Fin_RealEstate t – 1 + β19 Fin_OtherAssetst – 1 + β20 Fin_SVC t -1 + β21 Fin_ INTt -1 + β22Fin_ DEFRETt-1
+ β23 Fin_RPLNA t -1 + β24Fin_ ATRANS t -1 + β25 Fin_DA t – 1 + β26 Fin_NDA t – 1 + ε
(15)
Variable24
Pre SFAS 158
2004-05
Post SFAS 158
2007-2011
Difference
F (1, 4081)
Prob>F

Variable
Pre SFAS 158
2003-05
Post SFAS 158
2007-2011
Difference25
F (1, 4072)
Prob>F

NPE
0.971***

EbPC
3.034***

Bonds
0.008

Equity
0.013

RealEstate
0.049*

OtherAssets
0.014

SVC
6.159

INT
4.955

RPLNA
3.003

DEFRET
4.040

ATRANS
6.016*

0.796***

-0.008

-0.001

0.014**

0.011

0.007

21.345***

9.396

-4.241

-0.167

-0.214

-0.175
3.62
0.057

-3.042
124.48
0.000

-0.009
0.60
0.440

0.001
0.00
0.954

-0.038
1.74
0.187

-0.007
0.26
0.613

15.186
3.97
0.047

4.441
0.16
0.688

-7.244
4.68
0.031

-4.207
0.51
0.474

-6.230
1.10
0.293

PLiab
-0.441

DA
13.818

NDA
-0.277

AssetTurn
-0.042

FinCrisis

Fin_Bonds

Fin_Equity

Fin_RealEstate

Fin_OtherAssets

Fin_SVC

0.119

1.358

1.402***

0.354***

-0.203***

-0.008

-0.028***

-0.033

-0.014

-11.768**

0.56
0.53
0.467

-12.46
0.04
0.840

1.679
14.55
0.000

0.396
16.12
0.000

62.16
0.000

1.04
0.308

17.61
0.000

1.97
0.161

2.37
0.124

3.86
0.050

24

*, **, *** Significance at 0.10, 0.05, 0.01

25

For the variables FinCrisis, Fin_XXX, I am testing if these coefficients are equal to zero.
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Table 12 (cont.)
Variable
Post SFAS 158
2007-2011
F (1, 4911) 26
Prob>F

Fin_INT
28.386***

Fin_DEFRET
0.727

Fin_RPLNA
4.864*

Fin_ATRANS
0.868

Fin_DA
133.466**

Fin_NDA
-2.776

15.79
0.000

0.02
0.890

3.15
0.076

0.03
0.869

4.12
0.042

49.13
0.000

Adjusted R2
Pre-SFAS 158: 0.0607
Post-SFAS 158: 0.1996
H0: β0 = β1 = ……= β 33 = 0
F (43, 4081) = 23.45
Prob > F = 0.000
H0: NPE1 = NPE2 & EbPC2 = EbPC1…..& AssetTurn2 = AssetTurn1& Fin2Crisis= 0 &….Fin2_OtherAssets = 027
F (27, 4081) = 18.97
Prob > F = 0.000
f

MVE
NPE
EbPC
Bonds
Equity
RealEstate
OtherAssets
PLiab
SVC
INT
26

Fiscal year-end market value of common equity at time t or t-1
Owner’s equity plus net pension liabilities
Earnings before extraordinary items before pension costs
Pension assets invested in bonds
Pension assets invested in equities
Pension assets invested in real estate
Pension assets not invested in equities, bonds, or real estate
Market value of firm’s pension debt
Pension service costs
Pension interest costs

FinCrisis
Fin_Bonds
Fin_Equity
Fin_RealEstate
Fin_OtherAssets
Fin_PLiab
Fin_SVC
Fin_INT
Fin_DEFRET
Fin_RPLNA

1 for years 2007, 2008, 2009, 0 otherwise
Interaction between FinCrisis and Bonds
Interaction between FinCrisis and Equity
Interaction between FinCrisis and RealEstate
Interaction between FinCrisis and OtherAssets
Interaction between FinCrisis and PLiab
Interaction between FinCrisis and SVC
Interaction between FinCrisis and INT
Interaction between FinCrisis and DEFRET
Interaction between FinCrisis and RPLNA

For the variables Fin_XXX, I am testing if these coefficients are equal to zero.

27

NPE1 is the coefficient for NPE in pre-SFAS 158 period, NPE2 is the coefficient for NPE in post-SFAS 158 period, etc. and Fin2Crisis is the coefficient
for FinCrisis in the post–SFAS 158 period, etc.
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Table 12 (cont.)
DEFRET
RPLNA
ATRANS
DA
NDA
AssetTurn

Deferred return on plan assets
Actual return on plan assets
Amortization of the transition asset
Discretionary accruals using the Modified Jones model
Nondiscretionary accruals using the Modified Jones model
Sales divided by total assets

Fin_ATRANS
Fin_DA
Fin_NDA
Fin_AssetTurn
N
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Interaction between FinCrisis and ATRANS
Interaction between FinCrisis and DA
Interaction between FinCrisis and NDA
Interaction between FinCrisis and AssetTurn
Number of firm years

Table 13 Percentages of Classes of Pension Assetsa
Year
2003
N = 504

2004
N = 789

2005
N = 863

2006
N = 878

2007
N = 803

Variable
Bonds
Equity
RealEstate
OtherAssets
Bonds
Equity
RealEstate
OtherAssets
Bonds
Equity
RealEstate
OtherAssets
Bonds
Equity
RealEstate
OtherAssets
Bonds
Equity
RealEstate
OtherAssets

Mean
30.45
63.94
1.09
4.51
30.94
63.71
1.07
4.26
30.47
63.74
1.26
4.53
30.84
62.98
1.45
4.73
32.00
61.08
1.44
5.47

St. dev.
12.55
13.65
2.63
11.57
12.81
13.56
2.64
10.34
13.08
13.44
2.90
9.62
14.18
14.44
3.32
10.40
14.48
14.92
3.30
12.05

Year
2008
N = 731

2009
N = 753

2010
N = 763

2011
N = 748

Variable
Bonds
Equity
RealEstate
OtherAssets
Bonds
Equity
RealEstate
OtherAssets
Bonds
Equity
RealEstate
OtherAssets
Bonds
Equity
RealEstate
OtherAssets

Mean
37.46
53.73
1.77
7.05
37.14
54.63
1.34
6.90
37.37
54.64
1.26
6.73
39.88
51.76
1.145
6.91

St. dev.
15.11
14.92
4.06
13.35
15.34
16.41
3.12
13.11
15.79
16.75
2.95
12.81
16.18
17.03
3.08
12.14

Changes in the percentages for the classes of pension assets
Equity
Bonds
RealEstate
OtherAssets
2003-2005
-0.31%
0.10%
15.60%
0.44%
2006-2011
-17.82%
29.27%
0.00%
46.09%
Overall
-19.05%
30.97%
33.03%
53.22%
a

Equity
Bonds
RealEstate
OtherAssets
N

Percentage of plan assets invested in equities
Percentage of plan assets invested in bonds
Percentage of plan assets invested in real estate
Percentage of plan assets not invested in equities, bonds, or real estate
Number of firm years
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Table 14
Descriptive statistics for 2003-2011, variables in per-share form, 1170 firms
N = 6832 b
(Number of underfunded firms = 6,226; Number of fully or overfunded firms = 606)
Variable

Mean

Std. dev.

Variable

MVE

8586.43

26375.74

OtherAssets

40.90

Std.
dev.
155.72

NPE

17.07

44.25

Funded

77.91

19.78

EbPC

2.97

8.24

SVC

38.62

128.18

Bonds

387.53

773.04

INT

97.89

362.57

Equity

212.64

416.42

EXPRET

1620.52

6594.67

12.94

59.31

Div

195.55

790.49

Size

-3.07

1.66

RealEstate

b

MVE
NPE
EbPC

Bonds
Equity
RealEstate
OtherAssets
Funded
SVC
INT
EXPRET
Div
Size
N

Mean

Fiscal year-end market value of common equity
Owner’s equity plus net pension liabilities scaled by common shares outstanding
Earnings before extraordinary items before pension costs scaled by common shares
outstanding
Pension assets invested in bonds scaled by common shares outstanding
Pension assets invested in equities scaled by common shares outstanding
Pension assets invested in real estate scaled by common shares outstanding
Pension assets not invested in equities, bonds, or real estate scaled by common shares
outstanding
Percentage Funded using Pension Assets less Pension Benefit Obligation, (PA – PBO)
Pension service costs scaled by common shares outstanding
Pension interest costs scaled by common shares outstanding
Expected Return on plan Assets scaled by common shares outstanding
Dividends scaled by common shares outstanding
Natural logarithm of total assets
Number of firm years
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Figure 3
Percentages of Classes off Pension Asssets
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Table 15 Estimation of market value for 2003-2011, variables in per-share form
N = 6000 c
(Number of underfunded firms = 4,777; Number of fully or overfunded firms = 1223)
MVEit = β0 + β1 NPEit + β2 EbPCit + β3 Bondsi+ β4 Equityit + β5 Real Estateit + β6 Other Assetsit
+ β7 Fundedit + β8 Underit + β9Under_Fundedit+ β10 Under_Bondsit + β11 SVCit + β12 INTit
+ β13 EXPRETit + β14 sizeit + β15 size_Under2it + β16 Divit + β17 FinCrisisit
+ β18 Fin_Bondsit + β19 Fin_Equityit + β20 Fin_RealEstateit + β21 Fin_OtherAssetsit
+ β22 Fin_Underit + β23 Fin_Fundedit + β24 Fin_Under_Fundedit + ε
(6)

Variables
NPE
EbPC
Bonds
Equity
RealEstate
OtherAssets
Funded
Under
Under_Funded
Under_Bonds
SVC
INT
EXPRET
size
size_Under
Div
FinCrisis
Fin_Bonds
Fin_Equity
Fin_RealEstate
Fin_OtherAssets
Fin_Under
Fin_Funded
Fin_Under_Funded

Model(1)
16.506**
75.732***
-1.058
-1.941***
4.766
-0.810
-4.263
-7881.015***
4069.536***
1.352**
22.204***
0.274
0.221***
195.518
-590.825***
5.138***
-3395.354***
0.561
0.012
-28.965***
0.420
6587.897***
9.336***
-5926.085***

Adjusted R2

0.1025

*, **, *** Significance at .10, .05, .01.
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Table 15 (cont.)
c

MVE
NPE
EbPC
Bonds
Equity
RealEstate
OtherAssets

Funded
Under
Under_Funded
Under_Bonds
SVC
INT
EXPRET
Div
size
size_Under
FinCrisis
Fin_Bonds
Fin_Equity
Fin_RealEstate
Fin_OtherAssets
Fin_Under
Fin_Funded
Fin_Under_Funded
N

Fiscal year-end market value of common equity
Owner’s equity plus net pension liabilities scaled by common shares outstanding
Earnings before extraordinary items before pension costs scaled by common
shares outstanding
Pension assets invested in bonds scaled by common shares outstanding
Pension assets invested in equities scaled by common shares outstanding
Pension assets invested in real estate scaled by common shares outstanding
Pension assets not invested in equities, bonds, or real estate scaled by common
shares outstanding
Pension assets divided by Accumulated Benefit Obligation, PA/ABO
1 if Funded < 1, 0 otherwise
Interaction term for Under and Funded
Interaction term for Under and Bonds
Pension service costs scaled by common shares outstanding
Pension interest costs scaled by common shares outstanding
Expected Return on plan Assets scaled by common shares outstanding
Dividends scaled by common shares outstanding
Natural logarithm of total assets
Interaction term for size and Under
If year = 2008-09, 1; 0 otherwise
Interaction between FinCrisis and plan assets invested in bonds
Interaction between FinCrisis and plan assets invested in equities
Interaction between FinCrisis and plan assets invested in real estate
Interaction between FinCrisis and plan assets not invested in equities, bonds, or
real estate
Interaction between FinCrisis and Under
Interaction between FinCrisis and Funded
Interaction between FinCrisis and Under and Funded
Number of firm years
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Table 16 Estimation of market value for 2003-2011, variables in per-share form
N = 6832 d
(Number of underfunded firms = 6,226; Number of fully or overfunded firms = 606)
MVEit = β0 + β1 NPEit + β2 EbPCit + β3 Bondsi+ β4 Equityit + β5 RealEstateit + β6 OtherAssetsit
+ β7 Funded2it + β8 Under2it + β9Under2_Funded2it+ β10 Under2_Bondsit + β11 SVCit + β12 INTit
+ β13 EXPRETit + β14 sizeit + β15 size_Under2it + β16 Divit + β17 FinCrisisit
+ β18 Fin_Bondsit + β19 Fin_Equityit + β20 Fin_RealEstateit + β21 Fin_OtherAssetsit
+ β22 Fin_Under2it + β23 Fin_Funded2it + β24 Fin_Under2_Funded2it + ε
(6)

Variables
NPE
EbPC
Bonds
Equity
RealEstate
OtherAssets
Funded2
Under2
Under2_Funded2
Under2_Bonds
SVC
INT
EXPRET
size
size_Under2
Div
FinCrisis
Fin_Bonds
Fin_Equity
Fin_RealEstate
Fin_OtherAssets
Fin_Under2
Fin_Funded2
Fin_Under2_Funded2

Model(2)
11.473*
71.221***
-1.712**
-1.872***
4.066
-0.294
56.985**
-4960.355***
-0.987
1.713**
21.969***
-0.207
0.226***
692.911***
-971.243***
5.125***
-4283.356***
0.392
0.041
-29.605***
-0.139
12771.060**
65.127
-33.309**

Adjusted R2

0.1033

*, **, *** Significance at .10, .05, .01.
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Table 16 (cont.)
d

MVE
NPE
EbPC
Bonds
Equity
RealEstate
OtherAssets

Funded2
Under2
Under2_Funded2
Under2_Bonds
SVC
INT
EXPRET
Div
size
size_Under2
FinCrisis
Fin_Bonds
Fin_Equity
Fin_RealEstate
Fin_OtherAssets
Fin_Under2
Fin_Funded2
Fin_Under2_Funded2
N

Fiscal year-end market value of common equity
Owner’s equity plus net pension liabilities scaled by common shares outstanding
Earnings before extraordinary items before pension costs scaled by common
shares outstanding
Pension assets invested in bonds scaled by common shares outstanding
Pension assets invested in equities scaled by common shares outstanding
Pension assets invested in real estate scaled by common shares outstanding
Pension assets not invested in equities, bonds, or real estate scaled by common
shares outstanding
Percentage Funded using Pension Assets less Pension Benefit Obligation,
100 * (1 +((PA – PBO) /PBO))
1 if Funded2 < 100%, 0 otherwise
Interaction term for Under2 and Funded2
Interaction term for Under2 and Bonds
Pension service costs scaled by common shares outstanding
Pension interest costs scaled by common shares outstanding
Expected Return on plan Assets scaled by common shares outstanding
Dividends scaled by common shares outstanding
Natural logarithm of total assets
Interaction term for size and Under2
If year = 2008-09, 1; 0 otherwise
Interaction between FinCrisis and plan assets invested in bonds
Interaction between FinCrisis and plan assets invested in equities
Interaction between FinCrisis and plan assets invested in real estate
Interaction between FinCrisis and plan assets not invested in equities, bonds, or
real estate
Interaction between FinCrisis and Under2
Interaction between FinCrisis and Funded2
Interaction between FinCrisis and Under2 and Funded2
Number of firm years
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Table 17 Estimation of market value for 2003-2011, variables in per-share form to determine the effect of SFAS 158 N = 6000e
N = 1878 for 2003-2005 with 1481 underfunded and 397 fully or overfunded; N = 4122 for 2006-2011 with 3296 underfunded
and 826 fully or overfunded
MVEit = β0 + β1 NPEit + β2 EbPCit + β3 Bondsi+ β4 Equityit + β5 Real Estateit + β6 Other Assetsit + β7 Fundedit + β8 Underit + β9Under_Fundedit
+ β10 Under_Bondsit + β11 SVCit + β12 INTit + β13 EXPRETit + β14 sizeit + β15 size_Underit + β16 Divit + β17 FinCrisisit+ β18 Fin_Bondsit
+ β19 Fin_Equityit + β20 Fin_RealEstateit + β21 Fin_OtherAssetsit + β22 Fin_Underit + β23 Fin_Fundedit + β24 Fin_Under_Fundedit + ε
(6)

Variable28
Pre SFAS 158
2003-05
Post SFAS 158
2006-2011
Difference
F (1, 4883)
Prob>F

NPE
13.191

EbPC
37.518

Bonds
-5.805***

Equity
-0.998

RealEstate
12.619*

OtherAssets
-1.821

Funded
-1.233

Under
-8294.605***

Under_Funded
3552.76*

10.461

86.794***

-3.044***

-1.549***

2.751

-1.006

151.312

-8024.644***

3205.284

-2.7
0.02
0.88

49.3
0.52
0.47

2.8
1.30
0.25

-0.6
0.91
0.34

-9.9
2.70
0.10

0.8
0.20
0.66

152.5
0.36
0.55

270.0
0.01
0.91

-347.5
0.03
0.87

Variable
Pre SFAS 158
2003-05
Post SFAS 158
2006-2011
Difference29
F (1, 4883)
Prob>F

Under_Bonds
6.936***

INT
-17.366***

SVC
82.660***

EXPRET
0.450**

size
-436.736

size_Under
-597.500

Div
3.898***

FinCrisis

Fin_Bonds

2.695***

9.183***

20.886***

0.095

488.823*

-879.580***

5.112***

-3092.763***

0.231

-4.2
3.39
0.07

26.5
83.37
0.00

-61.8
63.71
0.00

-0.4
3.70
0.05

925.6
4.91
0.02

-282.1
0.36
0.55

1.2
5.71
0.02

13.06
0.00

0.04
0.83

28

*, **, *** Significance at 0.10, 0.05, 0.01

29

For the variables FinCrisis, Fin_Bonds, Fin_Equity, Fin_RealEstate, and Fin_Other Assets, Fin_Under, Fin_Funded, Fin_Under_Funded, I am testing
if these coefficients are equal to zero.
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Table 17 (Cont.)
Variable
Post SFAS 158
2006-2011
Difference30
F (1, 4883)
Prob>F

Fin_Equity
0.136

Fin_RealEstate
-30.062***

Fin_Other Assets
0.876

Fin_Under
5542.59***

Fin_Funded
-140.930

Fin_Under_Funded
-5326.042***

0.05
0.82

17.64
0.00

0.17
0.68

9.77
0.00

0.33
0.57

6.79
0.01

H0: β0 = β1 = ……= β24 = 0
F(41, 4883) = 17.79
Prob>F = 0.000
e

MVE
NPE
EbPC
Bonds
Equity
RealEstate
OtherAssets
Funded
Under
Under_Funded
Under_Bonds
SVC
INT
EXPRET
Div
size
size_Under

H0: NPE1 = NPE2 & EbPC2 = EbPC1…..& Div2 = Div1& Fin2Crisis= 0 &….Fin2_Under_Funded = 031
F(24, 4883) = 9.57
Prob>F = 0.000
Fiscal year-end market value of common equity
Owner’s equity plus net pension liabilities scaled by common shares outstanding
Earnings before extraordinary items before pension costs scaled by common shares outstanding
Pension assets invested in bonds scaled by common shares outstanding
Pension assets invested in equities scaled by common shares outstanding
Pension assets invested in real estate scaled by common shares outstanding
Pension assets not invested in equities, bonds, or real estate scaled by common shares outstanding
Pension assets divided by accumulated benefit obligation: PA/ABO
1 if Funded < 1; 0 otherwise
Interaction term for Under and Funded
Interaction term for Under and Bonds
Pension service costs scaled by common shares outstanding
Pension interest costs scaled by common shares outstanding
Expected Return on plan Assets scaled by common shares outstanding
Dividends scaled by common shares outstanding
Natural logarithm of total assets
Interaction term for size and Under

30

For the variables FinCrisis, Fin_Bonds, Fin_Equity, Fin_RealEstate, and Fin_OtherAssets, Fin_Under, Fin_Funded, Fin_Under_Funded I am testing
if these coefficients are equal to zero.

31

NPE1 is the coefficient for NPE in pre-SFAS 158 period, NPE2 is the coefficient for NPE in post-SFAS 158 period, etc. and FinCrisis is the
coefficient for FinCrisis in the post –SFAS 158 period, etc.
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Table 17 (Cont.)
FinCrisis
Fin_Bonds
Fin_Equity
Fin_RealEstate
Fin_OtherAssets
Fin_Under
Fin_Funded
Fin_Under_Funded
N

If year = 2008-09, 1; 0 otherwise
Interaction between FinCrisis and plan assets invested in bonds
Interaction between FinCrisis and plan assets invested in equities
Interaction between FinCrisis and plan assets invested in real estate
Interaction between FinCrisis and plan assets not invested in equities, bonds, or real estate
Interaction between FinCrisis and Under
Interaction between FinCrisis and Funded
Interaction between FinCrisis and Under and Funded
Number of firm years
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Table 18 Estimation of market value for 2003-2011, variables in per-share form to determine the effect of SFAS 158 N = 6832 f
N = 2156 for 2003-2005 with 1995 underfunded and 161 fully or overfunded; N = 4676 for 2006-2011 with 4231 underfunded and
445 fully or overfunded
MVEit = β0 + β1 NPEit + β2 EbPCit + β3 Bondsi+ β4 Equityit + β5 RealEstateit + β6 OtherAssetsit + β7 Funded2it + β8 Under2it + β9Under2_Funded2it
+ β10 Under2_Bondsit + β11 SVCit + β12 INTit + β13 EXPRETit + β14 sizeit + β15 size_Under2it + β16 Divit + β17 FinCrisisit+ β18 Fin_Bondsit
+ β19 Fin_Equityit + β20 Fin_RealEstateit + β21 Fin_OtherAssetsit + β22 Fin_Under2it + β23 Fin_Funded2it + β24 Fin_Under2_Funded2it + ε

Variable32
Pre SFAS 158
2003-05
Post SFAS 158
2006-2011
Difference
F (1, 5621)
Prob>F

NPE
12.494

EbPC
31.900

Bonds
-8.042**

Equity
-1.217*

RealEstate
-1.217*

OtherAssets
-0.433

Funded2
63.69**

Under2
-6029.52**

Under2_Funded2
-2.860

4.491

89.406***

-3.799***

-1.682***

3.688

-0.802

-19.103

-5781.165***

-19.103

0.25
0.62

0.97
0.33

1.30
0.25

0.62
0.43

2.37
0.12

0.05
0.82

0.00
0.97

0.01
0.092

0.25
0.62

Variable
Pre SFAS 158
2003-05
Post SFAS 158
2006-2011
Difference33
F (1, 5621)
Prob>F

Under2_Bonds
7.880***

INT
-18.119***

SVC
78.726***

EXPRET
0.464***

size
522.871

size_Under2
-1322.519**

Div
4.351***

FinCrisis

Fin_Bonds

3.475***

7.463***

23.239***

0.088

809.186***

-1041.611***

5.108***

-4363.264***

0.020

1.70
0.19

69.49
0.00

81.44
0.00

4.72
0.03

0.25
0.62

0.21
0.64

2.66
0.10

11.23
0.000

0.00
0.98

32

(6)

*, **, *** Significance at 0.10, 0.05, 0.01

33

For the variables FinCrisis, Fin_Bonds, Fin_Equity, Fin_RealEstate, and Fin_Other Assets, Fin_Under, Fin_Funded, Fin_Under_Funded I am testing if
these coefficients are equal to zero.
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Table 18 (Cont.)
Variable
Post SFAS 158
2006-2011
Difference34
F (1, 5621)
Prob>F

Fin_Equity
0.114

Fin_RealEstate
-30.131***

Fin_Other Assets
0.488

Fin_Under2
11181.7*

Fin_Funded2
56.789

Fin_Under2_Funded2
-92.922*

0.04
0.84

20.64
0.00

0.06
0.80

3.39
0.07

1.27
0.26

3.06
0.08

H0: β0 = β1 = ……= β24 = 0
F(41, 5621) = 20.20
Prob>F = 0.000
f

MVE
NPE
EbPC
Bonds
Equity
RealEstate
OtherAssets
Funded2
Under2
Under2_Funded2
Under2_Bonds
SVC
INT
EXPRET

H0: NPE1 = NPE2 & EbPC2 = EbPC1…..& Div2 = Div1& Fin2Crisis= 0 &….Fin2_Under_Funded = 035
F(24, 5621) = 10.20
Prob>F = 0.000
Fiscal year-end market value of common equity
Owner’s equity plus net pension liabilities scaled by common shares outstanding
Earnings before extraordinary items before pension costs scaled by common shares outstanding
Pension assets invested in bonds scaled by common shares outstanding
Pension assets invested in equities scaled by common shares outstanding
Pension assets invested in real estate scaled by common shares outstanding
Pension assets not invested in equities, bonds, or real estate scaled by common shares outstanding
Percentage Funded using Pension Assets less Pension Benefit Obligation, 100 * (1 +((PA – PBO) /PBO))
1 if Funded2< 100%, 0 otherwise
Interaction term for Under2 and Funded2
Interaction term for Under2 and Bonds
Pension service costs scaled by common shares outstanding
Pension interest costs scaled by common shares outstanding
Expected Return on plan Assets scaled by common shares outstanding

34

For the variables FinCrisis, Fin_Bonds, Fin_Equity, Fin_RealEstate, and Fin_OtherAssets, Fin_Under2, Fin_Funded2, Fin_Under2_Funded2 I am testing
if these coefficients are equal to zero.

35

NPE1 is the coefficient for NPE in pre-SFAS 158 period, NPE2 is the coefficient for NPE in post-SFAS 158 period, etc. and FinCrisis is the coefficient
for FinCrisis in the post –SFAS 158 period, etc.
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Table 18 (Cont.)
Div
size
size_Under2
FinCrisis
Fin_Bonds
Fin_Equity
Fin_RealEstate
Fin_OtherAssets
Fin_Under2
Fin_Funded2
Fin_Under2_Funded2
N

Dividends scaled by common shares outstanding
Natural logarithm of total assets
Interaction term for size and Under2
If year = 2008-09, 1; 0 otherwise
Interaction between FinCrisis and plan assets invested in bonds
Interaction between FinCrisis and plan assets invested in equities
Interaction between FinCrisis and plan assets invested in real estate
Interaction between FinCrisis and plan assets not invested in equities, bonds, or real estate
Interaction between FinCrisis and Under2
Interaction between FinCrisis and Funded2
Interaction between FinCrisis and Under2 and Funded2
Number of firm years
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Table 19 Estimation of market value for 2003-2011, variables in per-share form
N = 6000 g
(Number of underfunded firms = 4,777; Number of fully or overfunded firms = 1223)
MVEit = β0 + β1 NPEit + β2 EbPCit + β3 Bondsi+ β4 Equityit + β5 Real Estateit + β6 Other Assetsit
+ β7 Fundedit + β8 Underit + β9Under_Fundedit+ β10 Under_Bondsit + β11 SVCit + β12 INTit
+ β13 EXPRETit + β14 sizeit + β15 size_Under2it + β16 Divit + β17 FinCrisisit
+ β18 Fin_Bondsit + β19 Fin_Equityit + β20 Fin_RealEstateit + β21 Fin_OtherAssetsit
+ β22 Fin_Underit + β23 Fin_Fundedit + β24 Fin_Under_Fundedit + ε
(6)

Variables
NPE
EbPC
Bonds
Equity
RealEstate
OtherAssets
Funded
Under
Under_Funded
Under_Bonds
SVC
INT
EXPRET
size
size_Under
Div
FinCrisis
Fin_Bonds
Fin_Equity
Fin_RealEstate
Fin_OtherAssets
Fin_Under
Fin_Funded
Fin_Under_Funded
Adjusted R2

Model(2)
Model(3)
16.506**
14.694*
75.732***
81.521***
-1.058
-0.668
-1.941***
-1.740***
4.766
4.448
-0.810
-0.472
-4.263
-3.778
-7881.015*** -6223.169***
4069.536***
2131.482
1.352**
0.809
22.204***
22.965***
0.274
-0.629
0.221***
0.219***
195.518
246.277
-590.825***
-633.149***
5.138***
5.110***
-3395.354***
-330.223
0.561
0.128
0.012
0.218
-28.965***
-7.190
0.420
-0.188
6587.897***
1422.974**
9.336***
5.040
-5926.085*** -3362.910***
0.1025

0.0957

*, **, *** Significance at .10, .05, .01.
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Model(4)
15.228*
81.527***
-1.442
-1.901***
4.416
-0.847
-4.157
-6325.666***
2064.886
1.717**
22.229***
0.080
0.226***
235.398
-627.859***
5.105***
-424.140
0.257
0.224
-32.059***
0.297
1435.358**
5.455
-2956.053***
0.998

Table 19 (cont.)
g

MVE
NPE
EbPC
Bonds
Equity
RealEstate
OtherAssets

Funded
Under
Under_Funded
Under_Bonds
SVC
INT
EXPRET
Div
size
size_Under
Fin_Bonds
Fin_Equity
Fin_RealEstate
Fin_OtherAssets
Fin_Under
Fin_Funded
Fin_Under_Funded
N

Fiscal year-end market value of common equity
Owner’s equity plus net pension liabilities scaled by common shares outstanding
Earnings before extraordinary items before pension costs scaled by common
shares outstanding
Pension assets invested in bonds scaled by common shares outstanding
Pension assets invested in equities scaled by common shares outstanding
Pension assets invested in real estate scaled by common shares outstanding
Pension assets not invested in equities, bonds, or real estate scaled by common
shares outstanding
Pension assets divided by Accumulated Benefit Obligation, PA/AB0
1 if Funded < 1, 0 otherwise
Interaction term for Under and Funded
Interaction term for Under and Bonds
Pension service costs scaled by common shares outstanding
Pension interest costs scaled by common shares outstanding
Expected Return on plan Assets scaled by common shares outstanding
Dividends scaled by common shares outstanding
Natural logarithm of total assets
Interaction term for size and Under
Interaction between FinCrisis and plan assets invested in bonds
Interaction between FinCrisis and plan assets invested in equities
Interaction between FinCrisis and plan assets invested in real estate
Interaction between FinCrisis and plan assets not invested in equities, bonds, or
real estate
Interaction between FinCrisis and Under
Interaction between FinCrisis and Funded
Interaction between FinCrisis and Under and Funded
Number of firm years
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Appendix A: Estimation of DEFRET and ATRANS
TAMOR, the net deferral and amortization pension cost component, is required under
SFAS 87. What is not required is the four components of TAMOR: ATRANS
(amortization of the transition asset at the date of adoptions of SFAS 87); DEFRET (the
net gain or loss during the period which is deferred for later recognition); the
amortization of prior service cost; and the amortization of the gain or loss from earlier
periods. Barth et al. (1992) that ATRANS and DEFRET are the primary components of
TAMOR with the other two components assumed to be on average zero. They are often
not disclosed but can be calculated from information that is required in the financial
statements using a method outlined in Barth et al. (1992).
First, one starts by calculating EXPRET, the expected rate of return. It is the product
of the assumed long-term rate of return (rate) and the beginning- of-year plan assets
(PALAG).

l

is the remaining service life of the employees covered by the pension plan

and TR_ASSET is the transition asset at the time of adoption. The relations are as
follows:
EXPRET= rate * PALAG
DEFRET = EXPRET – RPLNA
ATRANS = 1/ l * TR_ASSET
TAMOR = DEFRET + ATRANS + ε
TAMOR + RPLNA = (rate * PALAG) + (1/ l * TR_ASSET)
Based on the relations above, the following cross-sectional regression is used to
estimate DEFRET and ATRANS:
120

TAMOR + RPLNA = β0 + β1 PALAG + β2 TR_ASSET + ε
(In Barth et al. (1996), other variables were included to control for early and non-early
adopters. Believing these effects have diminished sufficiently over time, I omit them).If
ATRANS or DEFRET are given then the estimated values are set equal to the reported
value.
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